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INTRODUCTION

Providing adequate legal protection for commercially valuable information is an old problem 1 that became of critical economic impor© Copyright J.H. Reichman 1991. All rights reserved.

*

Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; B.A., University of Chicago, 1955; J.D., Yale,
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Portions of this paper were first presented to the World Intellectual Property Organization's
Worldwide Symposium on the Intellectual Property Aspects of Artificial Intelligence, Stanford
Law School, March 25-27, 1991. The final version has benefitted from discussions with Randall
Davis, Mitchell Kapor, and Pamela Samuelson. The pertinent research was supported by grants
from the Kapor Family Foundation, the Vanderbilt Research Council, and Dean John J. Costonis.
The author gratefully acknowledges the contributions of his colleagues and the financial support
of his donors.
I. See, e.g., 3 STEPHEN P. LADAS. PATENTS. TRADEMARKS. AND RELATED RIGHTS - NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 1616-19 (1975); Alois Troller, The Legal Protection of
Know-How: General Report, in THE PROTECTION OF KNow-How IN 13 COUNTRIES 149 (H. Cohen Jehoram ed. 1972); Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection
of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1888-93 (1990).
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tance with the advent of electronic information processing. 2 Traditionally, contract and trade secret laws protect unpatented information in
the form of industrial know-how. 3 These laws make third-party acquisition of pertinent information unlawful when obtained by means excluded by private agreements, forbidden by law or against public policy." Viewed as know-how, information remains exempt from free
competition so long as it is neither voluntarily revealed nor reverse
engineered. 5
Keeping information under a regime of actual or legal secrecy was
never an easy task even in a less technologically advanced era. To begin
with, commercially valuable information is often manifested in tangible
working embodiments that function in the external environment.' Yet,
the intangible, intellectual character of information makes it indivisible, inexhaustible, and potentially ubiquitous once disclosed.7 To the
extent that one who controls a tangible vehicle of communication fails
to obtain effective control over the bundle of information it contains,
neither contract nor trade secret laws may suffice to prevent third parties from appropriating the competitive advantages that exclusivity otherwise confers. 8 The capacity to be conveyed or transmitted, a key feature of all industrial know-how,' thus makes bundles of information
resemble artistic works in the sense that disclosure or dissemination

2.

See, e.g.,

OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY

ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, INTELLECTUAL PROP-

ERTY RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION 157-87 (1986) ("Electronic media

establish an entirely new dimension for economies of scope in information production") [hereinafter OTA REPORT]; Franck Cavanagh, Gestion et exercice des droits d'auteur dons les banque de
donn~es: modes d'exploitation des donnies, in BANQUES DE DONNEES ET DROIT D'AUTEUR 23-37
(Institut de Recherche en Proprit6 Intellectuelle (IRPI) Henri Desbois ed. 1986).
3. See. e.g., Troller, supra note 1, at 151-52, 156-57 (discussing comparative surveys of
thirteen countries, including the United States); see also FRANIOIS DESSEMONTET. THE LEGAL
PROTECTION OF KNOW-HOw IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 29-49 (2d rev. ed. 1976).
4. See generally JAY DRATLER. JR., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COMMERCIAL, CREATIVE AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY §§ 4.04, 4.05 (1991).
5. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, Computer Programs as Applied Scientific Know-How: Implications of Copyright Protection for Commercialized University Research, 42 VAND. L. REV. 639,
657-58 (1989) (citing authorities); see also Edmund Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in
Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 683, 688-93, 699-701, 711-23 (1980).
6. See, e.g., William Kingston, The "Thesis" Chapters, in DIRECT PROTECTION OF INNOVATION 2-3 (Kingston ed. 1987); see also LADAS, supra note 1, at 1617.
7. See, e.g., FRANI;OIS MAGNIN. KNOW-HOW ET PROPRIETE INDUSTRIELLE 115-16 (1974);
ROBERT P. BENKO, PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: ISSUES AND CONTROVERSIES
21 (1987) (stressing that "knowledge goods . . . create problems of market failure, externalities,
and appropriability"); see also WILLIAM KINGSTON, INNOVATION, CREATIVITY AND LAW 83-85
(1990).
8. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 159-64 (1989)
(investing a competitor's right to reverse engineer unpatented, noncopyrightable products with
constitutional underpinnings); see also John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Bonito Boats: Uninformed But
Mandatory Innovation Policy, 1989 SuP. CT. REV. 283, 301-02 (1989).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/8
9. See MAGNIN, supra note 7, at 115-16.
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subjects them both to the free-rider problems generally associated with
"public goods."' 0
Because competitors would seldom need to pay for the economic
value of information in a world without some form of legal protection,
property rights enable gatherers to appropriate the value of their efforts," especially in the absence of unfair competition laws that prohibit slavish duplication." To the extent that publishers of information
depend on these proprietary rights, they look to the standard subjectmatter categories of classical intellectual property law, which are dominated by the patent and copyright paradigms.' 3 Patent law, however,

10. See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Il1 S. Ct. 1282, 1291 (1991)
(noncopyrightable listings of telephone directory could be freely used by publisher of other directories; copyright law does not protect information as product of effort and labor, but only as an
original work of authorship); see also Key Publications Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publishing Enters., 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991) (selection of businesses for ethnic telephone directory entitled
to copyright protection, but was not infringed by directory based on different selection criteria).
For the relation between the public good problem in copyright law and the larger problem of
protecting industrial know-how, compare I PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES. LAW AND
PRACTICE § 1.2 (1989 & Supp. 1992) with J. H. Reichman, Design Protection and the New
Technologies: The United States Experience in a TransnatiohalPerspective, 19 U. BALT. L. REV.
6, 144 (1989/1990) (arguing for sui generis protection of advanced technological know-how "that
behaves in the marketplace like works of art and literature notwithstanding its industrial character.") See infra text accompanying notes 218-28.
11. See Ralph S. Brown, Eligibility for Copyright Protection: A Search for Principled
Standards, 70 MINN. L. REV. 579 (1985); Wendy J. Gordon, An InquiryInto The Merits Of
Copyright: The Challenges Of Consistency, Consent, And Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 1343 (1989); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989); see also Monroe E. Price, Reexamining Intellectual
Property Concepts: A Glimpse into the Future Through the Prism of Chakrabarty, 6 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT L. J. 443.(1988) (questioning the "theology" of property law). But see
Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies,
and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970) (questioning the economic necessity for
copyright protection, even in the book trade); Tom G. Palmer, Intellectual Property: A NonPosnerian Law and Economic Approach, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 261 (1989).
12. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 155-168 (1989)
(holding state laws forbidding unauthorized reproduction of product configurations by direct
molding process unconstitutional under Sears-Compco.decisions of 1964); Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234
(1964). But see International News Serv. v. The Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (sole
Supreme Court decision recognizing "quasi-property right" in information as product of labor and
investment). See generally Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy
of InternationalNews Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI L. REV. 411 (1983); Leo J. Raskind,
The MisappropriationDoctrine as a Competitive Norm of-Intellectual Property Law, 75 MINN.
L. REV. 875, 900-906 (1991) (criticizing the "quasi-property" focus of INS, but justifying misappropriation doctrine rooted in "predatory, extra-commercial conduct" that is inconsistent with
socially beneficial economic rivalry).
13. See J.H. Reichman, supra note 5, at 648-55; cf. John H. Barton, Adapting the Intellectual Property System to New Technologies, paper presented to the National Research Council's
Conference on Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Arena of Science and Technology,
Washington,
D.C., January
8-9, 1992.
Published
by eCommons,
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excludes writings as such"' and requires industrial applications of technical information to meet strict substantive prerequisites. 5 The copyright model characteristically presupposes a degree of personal expres-

sion independent of the utilitarian tasks for which information is
compiled 16 Left to its own devices, classical intellectual property law
does not necessarily provide the proprietary rights that disseminators of
information need in order to1 7 overcome the free-rider problem common
to all intellectual creations.
Most Berne Union countries responded to this dilemma by tolerating strained applications of the classical copyright paradigm to unpatentable bundles of information that could not be protected as trade
secrets.1 8 This historic accommodation, however, always underestimated the extent to which information protected as a literary work

14. See U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (distinguishing the writings of an author from patentable discoveries with the latter understood to mean "inventions"); 35 U.S.C. §§ 100(a), 101
(1988); 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988) ("original works of authorship"); PETER D. ROSENBERG, I
PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 6.02[3] (rev. ed. 1990). See further Pamela Samuelson, Benson
Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer ProgramRelated Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1122-33 (1990) [hereinafter Benson Revisited].
15. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1988) (requiring novelty, utility, and nonobviousness).
16. See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property Law, 77 GEO. L. J. 287,
330-54 (1988) (discussing origins and implications of the "property/person connection"); Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 1869-70, 1881-93 (confirming the emphasis on personal expression, but
stressing the persistence of an incentive rationale to justify copyright protection of low-authorship
productions); see also J.H. Reichman, Goldstein on Copyright Law: A Realist's Approach to a
Technological Age, 43 STAN. L. REV. 943, 951-52 (1991) [hereinafter Realist's Approach] (demonstrating convergence of domestic and foreign standards of originality and creativity even before
Feist); Paul Edward Geller, Copyright in Factual Compilations: U.S. Supreme Court Decides
I.I.C. (forthcoming 1992) (noting that the United Kingdom remains "the
Feist Case, most significant exception to this consensus," and suggesting that a very low threshold of eligibility could conflict with the emerging law of the European Community).
17. See, e.g., EJAN MACKAAY, ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND LAW 117-18 (1982); infra text and authorities accompanying notes 218-223.
18. See infra note 33 (citing authorities on foreign law). For strained applications in United
States law, compare. e.g., Robert C. Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for
the Protection of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L REV. 516, 530-31 (1981) (advocating
sweat-of-the-brow theory of protection for compilations and data bases) with Robert A. Gorman,
Copyright Protectionfor the Collection and Representation of Facts, 76 HARv. L. REV. 1569,
1603-04 (1963) (advocating judicial identification of "originality" with "social contribution" of
diligent compiler, but limiting scope of protection to verbatim copying) and Robert A. Gorman,
Fact or Fancy? The Implicationsfor Copyright, 29 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 560 (1982) (rejecting
sweat-of-the-brow rationale in favor of original selection and arrangement theory). See also L.
Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of Copyright Protectionfor
Law Reports and Statutory Compilations,36 UCLA L. REV. 719, 728-31, 792-813 (1989) (criticizing strained applications of copyright law to factual works in particular and abusive extension
of the copyright monopoly in general); Gary L. Francione, Facing The Nation: The Standardsfor
Copyright. Infringement, and Fair Use of Factual Works, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 519 (1986) (rejecting copyright protection of facts as such in any form). See infra text accompanying notes 3340.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/8
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often constituted a business tool, not unlike other tools19 that were normally relegated to the different legal logic of industrial property laws.2 0
The advent of electronic information processing, and the crucial role it
will play in twenty-first century economics, mandates a reconsideration
of the inherently tool-like nature of these productions.
This article briefly explores some of the tensions that arise when
information is viewed either as a "literary work" or as a "tool" for
purposes of attracting legal protection within the classical intellectual
property framework. The article then suggests that these and other tensions confirm the need for a new intellectual property model that is not
premised on the classical distinction between "art" and "inventions."
This model would not only facilitate legal protection of data bases,
computer programs, and applications of artificial intelligence, it would
also benefit industrial design, biogenetic engineering, and other important technologies that fit imperfectly within the classical intellectual
property system.21
II.
A.

INFORMATION THROUGH THE PRISM OF CLASSICAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CONCEPTS

Copyright Protection of Small-Change Literary Productions

At first glance, the factual and functional works known abroad as
"the small change of copyright law" seem to present fewer systemic
anomalies than ornamental designs of useful articles, which never secured a firm foothold in the international copyright conventions.2 2 To
be sure, catalogues, directories, rule books, instruction manuals and
printed forms often exhibited the same chronically low levels of creative authorship that characterize the bulk of commercial designs. Their
barebones nature conflicts with the emphasis on personal expression
19. Cf Pamela Samuelson, Allocating Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated Works,
47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1185, 1205-09 (1986).
20. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); see infra notes 46-54 and accompanying
text.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 224-28.
22. Compare Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, as last revised at Paris, July 24, 1971 [hereinafter Berne Convention], Art. 2(l) ("The
expression 'literary and artistic works' shall include every production in the literary and artistic
domain, whatever may be the form or mode of its expression, such as books, pamphlets, and other
writings . . .") with id., arts. 2(7), 7(4) (requiring member states to protect works of "applied
art," but allowing these states to determine the criterion for distinguishing, this category of protectible works from nonprotectible industrial designs and also to determine "the conditions under
which . . . designs and models shall be protected"); and Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property, March 20, 1883, as last revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967 [hereinafter
Paris Convention], art. 5 quinquies (mandating the protection of industrial designs). See SAM
RICKETSON. THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS:

1886-1986
228-39 (1987).1991
Published
by eCommons,
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that traditionally drives the mature copyright paradigm. 23 At the same
time, copyright protection of low-authorship compilations never appeared to endow proprietors with competitive advantages in the general
products market like those accruing from copyright protection of industrial art.
Two-dimensional designs of useful articles that obtain copyright
protection as art are routinely embodied in three-dimensional products
that compete on the general products market. That market is normally
regulated by the patent system.2 4 Copyright protection in the name of
art thus enables manufacturers to avoid competition on the market for
industrial products without meeting the strict standards of the patent
paradigm. This "two-market conundrum" 2 eventually persuaded most
Berne Union countries to relegate three-dimensional industrial art to
sui generis design laws built on modified patent principles. 26 Sooner or
later, these laws induce courts and legislators to derogate from the
principle that eligibility in copyright law never depends on qualitative
discrimination. 7
In contrast, writings that convey utilitarian information were seldom embodied in products sold on the general products market, and
their admission to copyright law exerted less immediate pressure on the
frontier with patent law than was true of ornamental designs. Such
pressure would, of course, have arisen if copyright law had admitted
facts or ideas, or if the exclusive reproduction rights indirectly denied
access to facts and ideas that were otherwise ineligible. Once courts
and legislatures took steps to counter these vices, 28 however, no sui
generis laws were needed to deal with a "two-market conundrum"
mainly because industrial literature had yet to be invented!
Low-authorship factual and functional writings also bear a topographical resemblance to more creative works of a technical or scien-

See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., III S. Ct. 1282 (1991); 2
supra note 10, § 8.5, at 116-17; Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 1873-93.
24. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989); Baker v.
Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
25. See generally Reichman, supra note 10, at 130-33.
26. See id. at 8-10 (citing foreign authorities), 19-56 (discussing U.S. design patent law
after Congressional failure to enact sui generis design law), 56-81 (discussing noncopyrightability
of modern three-dimensional designs in U.S. copyright law). But see Yves Gaubiac, La thorie de
l'unit de 'art, III R.I.D.A. 2 (1982) (describing and criticizing French regime of copyright
protection for commercial designs).
27. See, e.g., RiCKETSON, supra note 22, at 231-32; Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing
Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
28. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(b), 103(b), 107, 113(b) (1988); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S.
99 (1879); cf Paul Katzenberger, Copyright Law and Data Banks, 21 I.I.C. 310, 322-26 (1990)
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/8
(discussing and criticizing case law in Federal Republic of Germany).
23.

GOLDSTEIN,
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tific character. 9 To exclude small-change literary productions from
copyright law on subject-matter or authorship grounds thus appeared
to entail another derogation from the principle of nondiscrimination,
one that seemed harder to justify in the absence of direct industrial
exploitation. 31 Such an exclusion would also have discouraged the gathering and dissemination of commercially valuable information by leaving it at the mercy of third-party duplicators who added no value of
their own. 3" The resulting state of chronic underprotection could, moreover, give way to countervailing bouts of overprotection if courts tried
to bridge the gap in intellectual property law with expansive applications of unfair competition law.3 2
The historical solution adopted in the Berne Union countries allowed most small-change literary productions to enter copyright law
qua writings that conveyed information, 33 while most industrial designs

29. See, e.g., 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 10, § 8.4, at 97 (stating that factual works "differ
from works of art in degree, not kind" and adding that it is only "the rare fact work that does not
bear some trace of the author's hand"); 'Adolph Dietz, Federal Republic of Germany, §§ 2[2],
[3], in I INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE (Paul E. Geller rev. ed. 1990) (comparing "scientific works" mentioned expressly in German Copyright Act with compilations based
on selection and arrangement of pre-existing elements, which qualify as "derivative works" when
sufficiently "original and personally distinctive in fashion or form"). But see RICKETSON, supra
note 22, at 232-33 (criticizing reference to scientific productions in Berne Conv., art. 2(l)); Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 1881-1900 (criticizing personality-based theories of copyright protection
and distinguishing between low- and high-authorship works).
30. See, e.g., RICKETSON, supra note 22, at 231-32; WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION. GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION FORTHE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS (Paris Act 1971) 12-13 (L. Masouyd & W. Wallace eds. 1978) [hereinafter WIPO

(describing universally recognized principle of nondiscrimination, even though the Berne
Convention itself imposes no express standard of eligibility and does not mention nondiscrimination).
31. See, e.g., Dietz, supra note 29, § 2[2] (stressing that "without copyright protection, this
'small change' of literary works would be left without any protection at all"); cf. Denicola, supra
GUIDE]

note 18, at 530-31.
32. See. e.g., International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918);
Raskind, supra note 12 (stressing need to restrain misappropriation branch of unfair competition
law); Luigi Carlo Ubertazzi, Copyright Protection of Computer Data Bases in Italy, 16 I.I.C.
725, 733 (1985) (concluding that Italian copyright law gives only limited protection to data bases,
but arguing that unfair competition rules "prohibit ...
systematic reproduction of another's information"); cf. Reichman, supra note 10, at 81-123 (documenting and criticizing recent expansion of Lanham Act § 43(a) to protect unpatented, noncopyrightable product configurations
against imitation as such).
33. See. e.g., RICKETSON, supra note 22, at 238-39; Frank Gotzen, Grand orientations du
droit d'auteur dans les &tats membres de la C.E.E. en mati~re de banque de donnbes, in BANQUES
DE DONNEES ET DROIT D'AUTEUR 86-98 (Institut de Recherche en Proprit6 Intellectuelle (IRPI)
Henri Desbois, ed. 1986). See further Michel Vivant, Etendue de la protection par le droit
d'auteur: les donn'es protbgkes - le traitement des donn&es, in BANQUES DE DONNEES ET DROIT
D'AUTEUR, supra, 13-21; Katzenberger, supra note 28; Ubertazzi, supra note 32, at 726-32; Andr6 Lucas, General Report - Data Bases and Copyright, in L'INFORMATIQUE ET LE DROIT DE
L'AUTEUR 332, 333-36 (proceedings of the ALAI Annual Congress, Quebec, Canada, Sept. 26-30,
1989). by
SeeeCommons,
also Takashi 1991
Yuasa, Computer Data Base Protection - The Impact of Japanese
Published
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were denied copyright protection qua products. 4 Consequently, domestic, foreign and, to some extent, international law recognized compilations of information that constituted original works of authorship as
copyrightable subject matter. a5
At the same time, courts in leading Berne Union countries acknowledged that the factual or utilitarian nature of these low-authorship literary productions required measures to limit the systemic contradictions they might breed. While the legal stratagems of choice
varied from one jurisdiction to another,3 and sometimes even within
the same jurisdiction at different times, 7 the overall tendency was to

Legislative Developments on United States and Japanese Copyright Law, 9 FORDHAM INT'L. L.J.
191 (1986).
For the extreme liberality of the United Kingdom in admitting low-authorship literary productions, see W. R. CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS. COPYRIGHT. TRADE MARKS
AND ALLIED RIGHTS 268-69 (2d ed. 1989). However, the criterion of eligibility in the United
Kingdom required mere skill, judgment and labor, see id. at 269, as distinct from the "personal
intellectual creation" of foreign law or the "original work of authorship" that United States law
has required since 1976. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988); Reichman, Realist's Approach, supra
note 16, at 950-54 (citing authorities that suggest a convergence between U.S. and foreign law in
this regard). The United Kingdom now appears virtually alone in applying the "skill, judgment
and labor" criterion. See, e.g., Geller, supra note 16.
34. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text. A significant exception to the consensus
against copyright protection for industrial art was France. For the French "unity of art" doctrine,
which still confers broad copyright protection on commercial designs, see generally Gaubiac,
supra note 26.
35. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 (definition of compilations), 103 (compilations as subject
matter) (1988); supra note 33 and accompanying text (foreign law); Berne Convention, supra
note 22, Art. 2(5). However, the status of "small-change" compilations under the Berne Convention is far from clear. Although Art. 2(l) purports to cast "literary and artistic productions" in
broad terms that specifically include "scientific" works, Art. 2(5) speaks only of "collections of
literary or artistic works such as encyclopedias and anthologies," whose eligibility depends on a
"selection and arrangement . . . constitut[ing] intellectual creations." The Convention thus required an "element of creativity" even before the advent of electronic information processing, and
there is no consensus about the nature of that requirement. See, e.g., WIPO GUIDE, supra note
30, at 20; Gotzen, supra note 33, at 94-97. Other difficulties arise from the.failure of the Convention text to distinguish "collective works" or "collections" from "compilations" in the English
sense, and also from the fact that Art. 2(5) did not mandate any protection of compilations that
select or arrange noncopyrightable subject matter, such as "the names and addresses in a telephone directory, the brief descriptions of items in a catalogue, and the headings, sub-headings and
individual entries in a sporting programme or radio-guide." RICKETSON, supra note 22, at 298303. For these and other reasons, the Commission of the European Communities has proposed to
protect noncopyrightable compilations, notably data bases, under a sui generis or neighboring
rights regime. See Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Directive on
the Legal Protection of Databases, Jan. 29, 1992 [hereinafter EC Proposed Directive].
36. See supra note 33.
37. See, eig., Geller, supra note 16 (comparing merger doctrine and its variants in foreign
law); Katzenberger, supra note 28, at 323-26. Katzenberger criticizes the "remarkable degree of
inconsistency" in German case law, which required only a "low-level of intellectual achievement"
for address and telephone books, mathematical tables, and legal or business forms (on which the
legislature had conferred tacit subject-matter recognition), while demanding a more than routine
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/8
creative contribution for engineering projects and computer programs. Id., at 324 (citing authori-
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limit the scope of protection for borderline literary productions to slavish imitation.3 8 In the United States, for example, the "thin copyright"
doctrine enunciated in Feist Publications,Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. 39 merely confirmed, with respect to factual works, what one
astute district court had earlier discovered to be an "open secret" with
respect to functional works."
In retrospect, the admission of small-change literary productions
to copyright law was a make-weight solution"' that harboured serious
flaws. The advent of computer programs, which entered copyright law

ties). According to Katzenberger, both computer programs and compilations of data should be
subject to the same eligibility requirements applicable to "adaptations and maps." Id., at 325-26.
38. During the 1950s, United States courts shifted away from excluding functional works
on subject-matter and eligibility grounds (a practice that was prominent at the time of Baker v.
Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879)), and concentrated on narrowing the scope of protection at the infringement stage. This shift was perfected in Continental Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958) (business form copyrightable because it conveyed
explanatory matter not entirely dictated by function, but defendant's noninfringing form was "sufficiently different"). The need to change methodologies followed from the Supreme Court's rejection of end-use or purpose tests of eligibility in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (dancing
figures used as lamp designs remained copyrightable works of art). See generally 2 GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 10, §§ 8.4, 8.5; Reichman, Realist's Approach, supra note 16, at 970-73.
For the narrow scope of protection some courts afforded factual works after the Copyright
Act of 1976, see id., at 966-70; cases cited infra note 89. In recent years, however, some courts
deviated from this tradition by investing the copyright in borderline factual works with strong
protection against derivative uses of the facts assembled. See, e.g., Illinois Bell. Tel. Co. v. Haines
& Co., 905 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990) (compiler's copyright extends to other uses of directories by
third parties, such as rearranging data by address rather than by name); United Tel. Co. of Mo. v.
Johnson Publishing Co., 855 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1988) (competitor infringed by using white pages
of telephone directory as initial reference for updating its own directory); Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v.
Feist Publications, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 214 (D. Kan. 1987) (use of white pages to prepare directory
without independent canvass held infringing use), affid, 916 F.2d' 718 (10th Cir. 1990) (unpublished), rev'd, I Il S. Ct. 1282 (1991). See also West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Central, Inc.,
799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987). Whether the Supreme Court's
Feist decision has altogether checked the budding expansionist treatment of derivative factual
works remains to be seen. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
39. 1I1 S. Ct. 1282, 1289 (1991) (thin protection of factual works); see, e.g., Geller, supra
note 16.
40. See Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Carabio, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124, 130 (E.D. Mich. 1979);
1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 10, at 197 (stating that functional works obtain only a "thin array of
rights").
41. Courts that limit infringement to slavish imitation may consciously enable the infringer's methodology retroactively to transform a factual compilation devoid of creative authorship into quasi-artistic property. See, e.g., Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 862 (2d
Cir. 1984) ("the sweat of a researcher's brow does not merit copyright protection absent, perhaps,
wholesale appropriation"); see also Financial Info., Inc. v. Moody's Investor's Serv., Inc., 808
F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987). On this approach, eligibility depends
on "the extensiveness of the defendant's copying; true sloth and great greed . . . will confer copyright upon . . . otherwise unprotectible labor." Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 1897. As a result, the
compiler is not protected from harm because of his copyright, but is found to possess a copyright
because by
he suffered
harm. 1991
Patterson & Joyce, supra note 18, at 729. •
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on analogy to both scientific works and the small-change,42 eventually
enabled publishers to embody "two-dimensional" compilations of instructions or data in chips and microelectronic processors that made
computers perform functional tasks. 3 The disembodied sets of instructions that initially attract copyright protection as writings thus become
embodied in products that compete on the market for specialized machine tools. This hybrid subcategory of industrial literature presents all
the problems associated with industrial art, including the "two-market
conundrum" that was presumed to be inapplicable to small-change literary productions*4
Even without these complicating developments, decisions favoring
copyright protection of low-authorship literary productions always underestimated the utilitarian and industrial applications to which packaged information was being put. Although one may have technically
conveyed information in the manner of a literary work, the body of
information thus conveyed often constituted a highly utilitarian business tool not unlike other tools that third parties need to use in connection with myriad products and processes."5 The protection of tool designs, however, turned historically on the altogether different legal logic
of industrial property law and not on the generous modalities of the
copyright paradigm.
B.

The Tool Design in Comparative Industrial Property Law

At the opposite pole from copyright protection of small-change literary productions lies the full patent paradigm, which in principle cov-

42.

See, e.g.,

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED

19-21 (1979) (released July 31, 1978), [hereinafter CONTU REPORT]
(relying on the Continental Casualty case, 253 F.2d at 702, to assuage fears of overprotection and
citing Baker v. Selden); Eugen Ulmer and Gert Kolle, Copyright Protection of Computer Programs, 14 I.I.C. 159 (1983).
43. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in Machine Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663 [hereinafter
CONTU Revisited]; Pamela Samuelson, Creatinga New Kind of Intellectual Property: Applying
the Lessons of the Chip Law to Computer Programs,70 MINN. L. REV. 471 (1985) [hereinafter
Lessons of the Chip Law].
44. Accord Samuelson, supra note 14, at 1128-29; see supra notes 24-27 and accompanying
text.
45. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (double-entry bookkeeping system); Bibbero Systems, Inc. v. Colwell Systems, Inc., 893 F.2d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1990) (noncopyrightable billing forms that doctors use for patients' insurance claims conveyed some information, but
the purpose was to record information; hence, rule against blank forms applied). Cf. Pamela Samuelson, Computer Programs, User Interfaces, and Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act of 1976:
Rethinking Lotus v. Paperback, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 281 (1.992) [hereinafter Rethinking
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/8
Lotus].
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ers any novel and sufficiently inventive information tool 4" but excludes
technical writings as such."7 Disregarding this exclusion, the threshold
requirement of nonobviousness constitutes the primary obstacle to the
patenting of any new tool." Most tool designs, like most ornamental
designs of useful articles, partake of incremental innovation almost by
definition. Yet, the nonobviousness requirement disqualifies innovation
that fails to make a major advance beyond the prior art."9 To overcome
this and other obstacles, comparative industrial property law reveals a
number of hybrid legal institutions that, in one form or another, afford
some degree of protection to what one is tempted to call the "small
change" of patent law.5" Of particular interest in this regard are the
utility model laws enacted in Germany, Italy, and Japan, which initially protected the external configurations of certain handtools and
other everyday implements. 5'
If patents for inventions require a. true inventive step, usually determined by a board of qualified patent examiners, then utility model
laws constituted an early and significant deviation from the norm. They

46. See. e.g., Ronald S. Laurie, The. Patentabilityof Artificial Intelligence Under U.S. Law,
in WIPO WORLDWIDE SYMPOSIUM ON THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASPECTS OF ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE 121-50 (1991) [hereinafter WIPO SYMPOSIUM]; Richard H. Stern, Tales from
The Algorithm War. Benson to Iwahashi, It's Deja Vu All Over Again, 18 AIPLA L.J. 371
(1991); Donald S. Chisum, The Patentabilityof Algorithms, 47 U. PITT. L. REV.959 (1986); see
also Henri W. Hanneman, Patentability of Computer Programs in Europe, in THE LAW OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN EUROPE 1992 A COMPARISON WITH THE USA 69-86 [A. P.
Meijboom & C. Prins eds. 1991]. But see Samuelson, supra note 14; Simpson L. Garfinkel, Richard M. Stallman & Mitchell D. Kapor, Why Patents Are Bad for Software, 8 ISSUES IN SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY 50-55 (1991).
47. See supra note 14.
48. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988) (stating that a "patent may not be obtained ...
if the
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the
subject matter as.a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains").
49. See. e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966); Edmund Kitch, Graham v.
John Deere Co.: New Standardsfor Patents, 1966 SUP. CT.REV. 303; Kingston, supra note 6, at
31 (regretting difficulty of protecting incremental innovation under "inventive step" (i.e., nonobviousness) criterion of all advanced industrialized countries). See generally Reichman, supra note 5,
at 656-62 ("Incremental Innovation Bearing Know-How on Its Face").
50. See generally J. H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, paper presented to the Conference on Information Law Toward the 21st Century, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands, June 12-16, 1991 and to the Tenth Annual Meeting of the
Association for the Advancement of Teaching and Research in Intellectual Property (ATRIP),
Salamanca, Spain, October 7-9, 1991 [hereinafter Legal Hybrids].
51. See, e.g., LADAS, supra note 1,at 949-56; TERUO DoI, THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW OF JAPAN 68-70 (1980); Rudolf Krasser, Die Entwicklung Des Gebrauchsmusterrechtsin
GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSHULTZ UND URHEBERRECHT IN DEUTSCHLANDFESTSCHRIFT 617-89

(F.-K. Beier et al., eds. 1991); see also FRANCOIS PERRET, L'AUTONOMIE DU REGIME DE PROTECTION DES DESSINS ET MODELES 188-233 (1974). For summaries of the relevant laws, see DESIGNS
AND UTILITY MODELS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD (Anne Marie Green and Alan J.Jacobs, eds.,
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confer immediate patent-like protection on three-dimensional functional designs without requiring an examination of the prior art and
without imposing a strict standard of nonobviousness5 2 The pristine
purpose of such laws was to prevent third parties from duplicating the
external configurations of certain handtools and other everyday implements whose creative contribution fell chronically short of the inventive
height that the mature patent paradigm required.5 3 Because of their
historical emphasis on functional improvements attained by means of
three-dimensional shapes, utility model laws could not protect processes
and did not apply to most electronic circuit designs. 4
Like ornamental designs of useful articles, functional handtool designs were embodied in products sold on the open market, which made
their protection in trade secret law impracticable." Legislative decisions to protect utility models thus implicitly recognized that nonaesthetic handtool designs remained as vulnerable to appropriation by
third parties as ornamental designs of useful articles, which some countries protected under sui generis design laws. 56 Both functional and appearance designs evolve through incremental innovation, while in either
case the physical support bears the product of the designer's skilled
efforts on its face. Because most ornamental design laws exclude func-

52. See, e.g., F.-K. Beier, Introduction, in
AND ANTITRUST LAWS

1989) [hereinafter

GERMAN INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, COPYRIGHT

9-10 (F.-K. Beier, G. Schricker, & W. Fikentscher, eds., 2nd rev. ed.

GERMAN INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY LAWS];

E. H~Iusser, Utility Models: The Ex-

perience of the Federal Republic of Germany, 26 INDUS. PROP. 314 (1987); J.H. Reichman, Design Protection in Domestic and Foreign Copyright Law: From the Berne Revision of 1948 to the
Copyright Act of 1976, 1983 DUKE L. J. 1143, 1217-21 (discussing Italian utility model law)
[hereinafter Designs Before 1976]. See generally LADAS, supra note 1, at 949-62; G. SENA, I
DIRITTI SULLE INVENZIONI E SUI MODELLI INDUSTRIALI 515-549 (2nd ed. 1984); Emerson
Stringham, Gebrauchmuster, in PATENTS AND GEBRAUCHSMUSTER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 234-

67 (Emerson Stringham, ed., 1935) [hereinafter

PATENTS AND GEBRAUCHMUSTER].

53. See, e.g., Beier, supra note 52, at 9 (characterizing utility models as technical inventions
pertaining to "working tools or other useful commodities"; stressing that the "inventive concept
must be embodied in a three-dimensional form"; and stating that the utility model law of 1891
answered the need for "short-term, simple and inexpensive protection for smaller technical inventions"); Reichman, supra note 52, at 1216-20 (discussing Italian utility model law). Functional
improvements in early handtool design, including agricultural implements, often entailed elements
of form or shape that lacked the inventive height needed for eligibility in patent law. Their protection under utility model laws was of a predominantly local character. See, e.g., LADAS, supra note
1, at 949; PERRET, supra note 51, at 191-94; see also Stringham, supra note 52, at 254-55.
54. See LADAS, supra note 1, at 952-53; Stringham, supra note 52, at 254; H9usser, supra
note 52. Amendments to the German utility model law in 1986 expanded subject-matter protection to electrical circuits for the first time, but continued to require their incorporation into a
three-dimensional form. Beier, supra note 52, at 9.
55. See supra notes 3-10, 25-27 and accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., LADAS, supra note I, at 949-50 (tracing evolution of petty patent principle
from inventions of "tools, implements and objects of practical use" and stressing the now less valid
proposition that utility models "must fulfill a technical utility function ... by means of a specific
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/8
shape"). For the sui generis design laws, see supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
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tionally determined designs,"' utility model laws were devised to plug a
gap in the intellectual property universe"" that has widened inordinately with the advent of important new technologies.5 9
Utility model laws require a qualitatively significant degree of innovation in exchange for a relatively short-term immunity from competition.6 0 Although most statutes impose eligibility criteria akin to those
of patent law, courts tend to apply a softer, more subjective standard
than that of true nonobviousness,6 1 and the novelty standard appears
less absolute than that of European patent laws generally. 62 Moreover,
judicial validation of eligibility in the course of infringement actions
tends to favor secondary considerations such as commercial success and
copying.6" Utility model laws thus operate with a stricter discipline

57. See, e.g., Reichman, supra note 10, at 38. But see id. at 38-39, 147-50 (discussing the
United Kingdom's unregistered design right, enacted in 1988, which confers copyright-like protection on both functional and aesthetic designs, and the United States Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1989), which confers copyright-like protection on one
class of functional designs).
58. See, e.g., Beier, supra note 52, at 7 (stressing effort "to close a gap between the protection of registered designs (Geschmacksmuster) protecting the outer appearance but not the technical function of an article, and the long-term, expensive and not easily obtainable patent protection for more important inventions"); see also Stringham, supra note 52, at 252.
59. See, e.g., Takaharu Higashima & Kenji Ushiku, A New Means of InternationalProtection of Computer Programs Through the Paris Convention - A New Concept of Utility Model,
7 COMPUTER L.J. 1, 15-22 (1986); Robert P. Sabath, Note, Petty Patents in the Federal Republic
of Germany: A Solution to the Problem of Computer Software Protection?, 8 Sw. U. L. REV.
888-909 (1976); cf. Reichman, supra note 5, at 656-62.
60. See, e.g., Beier, supra note 52, at 9-10 (discussing standards of eligibility and noting
extension of duration from a maximum of six years to a maximum of eight years in the 1986
amendments to German law); Reichman, supra note 10, at 38 (citing authorities, but also noting
modern trend to lower the threshold of eligibility for the protection of functional designs
generally).
61. See, e.g., Stringham, supra note 52, at 254 ("Quantum of [inventive] novelty required
for Gebrauchsmuster is lower than that required for long-term patents"); Hermann Isay,
Gebrauchsmuster, in PATENTS AND GEBRAUCHMUSTER supra note 52, at 268, 289 (standard of
invention is "milder, but not entirely eliminated"); supra note 53.
62. See, e.g., Beier, supra note 52, at 10 (noting that, while the bar against prior publications is formally absolute, "only prior uses within the country have to be considered, and the
inventor enjoys a general grace period of six months with regard to his own publications"). This
deviated from the absolute novelty standard of German patent law, which admitted no such derogations. Id. The novelty standard under German utility model law thus resembled the novelty
standard under United States patent law, which remains less absolute than that of foreign law. Cf
35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
63. See, e.g., Isay, supra note 61, at 290 (discussing "judgment of values" that is "more or
less a matter of sensation"); infra note 66; cf. Reichman, supra note 10, at 31-37 (discussing role
of secondary factors in U.S. design patent law). Recent amendments to the German utility model
law have codified a softer standard of eligibility by requiring mere "inventive activity" rather than
a true inventive step. See, e.g., Hgusser, supra note 52; Beier, supra note 52, at 10 (distinguishing
utility model standard of erfinderischeSchritt from patent standard of erfinderische Tdtigkeit and
characterizing the former as "somewhat lower"). See generally Krasser, supra note 51, at 658-60.
In Germany,
the patent authorities
Published
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than that of the sui generis design laws, a phenomenon usually ascribed
to the functionality of the designs they protect."' At the same time,
while these laws nominally confer a bundle of exclusive rights comparable to that of patent law,65 they provide a narrow scope of protection in
keeping with the immediate availability of protection once registration
occurs 6 and with "the limited character of the invention. 67
Utility model laws follow theprinciple of exhaustion that is characteristic of most developed patent systems.68 Once a protected
handtool was sold on the open market, manufacturers normally lost
control over the uses to which their innovative functional designs could
be put. 9 Utility model laws thus required innovative toolmakers to exact the reward for their products in the monopoly prices applicable at
the time of first sale. By the same token, these laws normally precluded
manufacturers from asserting any claim to the value added to other
products by those who purchased and used the tools that embodied protected functional designs. The legal protection of handtool designs implicitly recognized that users of the tools add significant value to their
own products, an enterprise in.
which toolmakers contribute little beyond the efficiencies that entitled them to protection in the first
instance.7 O

registered, even though the right to protection arises immediately and lasts for an initial term of
three years. See Beier, supra note 52, at 10; infra note 66 and accompanying text.
64. See. e.g., LADAS, supra note 1, at 952-54; supra notes 57, 58 & 60 and accompanying
text.
65. See, e.g., Beier, supra note 52, at 10 ("same exclusive rights as a patent").
66. See supra note 63. The validity of a utility model is tested either during an infringement
action or in opposition proceedings before the Patent Office. In either case, they are enforceable
against infringers immediately after filing and registration, unlike patents, which require years to
issue. Beier, supra note 52, at 10. Many inventors accordingly file for both patents and utility
models concurrently, in order to fall back upon the utility model right while the patent application
is being examined. Id. Regardless of whether a patent issues or not, the utility model right affords
protection of "short-lived but commercially successful products which can easily be imitated." Id.
67. LADAS, supra note 1, at 955; see also Krasser, supra note 51, at 661-62; Isay, supra
note 61, at 289-90. Their narrow range of equivalents at the margin of the patent system arguably
"favor[ed] a competitive environment for improvements rather than an environment dominated by
the pioneer firm," in keeping with the economic prescription that Professors Merges and Nelson
developed - without reference to utility models - in 1990. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R.
Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L..REv. 839, 843-44 (1990).
However, ambiguities concerning the extent to which an equivalent technical result could be
freely reached by means of a different, nonprotected shape allow courts to enlarge the range of
protected equivalents in particular cases. See PERRET, supra note 51, at. 225-31.
68. See, e.g., CORN SH, supra note 33, at 199-201.
69. Cf id. at 200. "Most patent systems .. . have given the patentee-no right to control the
use or resale of goods which he has placed on the domestic.market or has allowed a licensee to
market there." Id.
70. Cf Samuelson, supra note 19, at 1185, 1192 (case for users' rights in computer-generated works).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/8
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Over the years, utility model laws have degenerated into petty patent laws that are less strictly tied to three-dimensional functional
shapes," and they remain of particular interest to single inventors and
to small- and medium-sized firms. 72 Commentators criticize this regime
because it undermines the integrity of the patent system and indirectly
weakens the free-market principles that patent law reinforces.7 3 Viewed
in relation to later marginal cases that challenge the systemic integrity
of world intellectual property law," however, the true defect of these
laws is that they arbitrarily enabled only certain categories of industrial designers to protect functional product configurations while ignoring the more general need to protect unpatentable, noncopyrightable
embodiments of know-how that could not otherwise qualify for trade
secret protection.7" In other words, utility model laws are hard to justify in terms of classical intellectual property theory,7" and efforts to
mitigate the strict substantive and formal prerequisites of patent law
are symptomatic of a larger malaise that fully revealed itself only in
the last quarter of the twentieth century."
Although it is fair to say that utility model laws are not the cure
for the family of problems generated by the drive to protect important
new technologies,7 8 this venerable legal institution nonetheless contains
valuable lessons for those seeking to resolve the current impasse. From

71. See, e.g., Beier, supra note 52, at 9 ("Notwithstanding the term 'utility model' and the
restriction to inventions in three-dimensional form, the utility model is in substance a 'petty patent' "). See generally PERRET, supra note 51, at 225-33 (criticizing untenable distinction between
innovative form and innovative technical idea, and arguing that, over time, utility model laws
necessarily protect static technical embodiments of natural forces under the guise of innovations in
form); see also supra note 67. Recent amendments to the German utility model law stop just
short of ratifying the "petty patent" concept while facilitating the protection of some electronic
circuit designs. See, e.g., Husser, supra note 52; Beier, supra note 52, at 9.
72. See, e.g., Beier, supra note 52, at 10. Utility models laws are also of considerable interest to the developing countries. See, e.g., William Lesser, An Overview of Intellectual Property
Systems, in STRENGTHENING

PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING

TRIES-A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE 5, 7-8
ENING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY]; Robert

STRENGTHENING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,

73.

(W. E. Siebeck, ed. 1990) [hereinafter

COUN-

STRENGTH-

E. Evenson, Survey of Empirical Studies, in

supra, at 33, 41-42.

See, e.g., PERRET. supra note 51,

at 188-95, 231-33; Marie-Angele Perot-Morel,

L'ambiguit du concept de mod'le d'utiliti, in ETUDES EN L'HONNEUR DE R. FRANCESCELLI 425
(1983); supra note 71.
74. See generally Reichman, supra note 5, at 662-67.
75. See generally id., at 648-662; supra text accompanying notes 3-20; infra text accompanying notes 218-228.
76. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. In developing countries, however, utility
models are, to some extent, a throwback to patents of importation, and they make particular
economic sense in early stages of industrial development. See, e.g., Evenson, supra note 72.
77. See infra text accompanying notes 218-23.
78. See generally Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 50 (Part 111). Evidence suggests
that new technologies in general, and electronic information processing in particular, would benefit
more in the long run from an approach that supplied a limited degree of artificial lead time than
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this perspective, utility model laws represent a form of intellectual
property protection specifically devised for innovative tool designs that
seems to have indirectly allowed the market to determine value without
discouraging competitors from making further improvements and without entitling innovators to the values that users add on their own. The
thrust of these laws, which cover "the small change of patent law,"
thus contrasts dramatically with recent developments affecting "the
small change of copyright law," a category that has paradoxically expanded to include electronic information tools.
C. Electronic Information Tools
The specialized market for literary and artistic works operates
with a peculiar legal and economic logic that, to varying degrees in
different countries, deliberately subordinates the price-setting function
of the market to broader cultural policies.7 9 Copyright law thus occupies a privileged position among the laws that regulate trade in that its
generous protective modalities need not strictly correlate with the demands of economic efficiency as measured in terms of utilitarian incentives to create.80 At the same time, courts and legislators took pains to
ensure that the liberal treatment afforded artistic works would not undermine competition on the general products market, whose operations
are governed by the much stricter requirements of patent law.81 The
extension of copyright protection to computer programs and other electronic information tools in the.1980s broke with this tradition, and the
resulting uncertainties cast doubt upon the continuing ability of copy-

from the modified patent approach institutionalized in utility model laws. See infra text and authorities accompanying notes 226-28.
79. See, e.g., FREDERIC POLLAUD-DULIAN, LE DROIT DE DESTINATION 106-07 (1989) (concluding that, while industrial property law aims to stimulate commercial and industrial activity,
copyright law promotes the creator's individual personality and the culture at large).
80. See, e.g., I STEPHEN P. LADAS. THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND
ARTISTIC PROPERTY 1-12 (1938) (surveying different theories of copyright law and finding none
of them able to account for the range of existing doctrines). For example, incentive theory cannot
account for the moral rights. Nor will it adequately explain such paternalistic measures in American copyright law as the right to terminate transfers, see 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304(c) (1988), or
even the long period of protection, which enables living authors and their immediate heirs to
partake of revenues generated many years after the creation of their works. See, e.g., Theodore
Limperg, Duration of Copyright Protection, 103 R.I.D.A. 53, 68-69, 72-77 (1980). For critiques
of the incentive rationale in United States copyright law from three different perspectives, see
Gordon, supra note 11; Hughes, supra note 16; Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 524-46 (1990).
81. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (definitions of useful articles and of pictorial graphic
and sculptural works, which exclude most commercial designs of useful articles), 102(b) (exclusion of ideas), § 113(b) (exclusion of useful articles portrayed in two-dimensional form), § 301
(pre-emption of common-law misappropriation not rooted in anti-competitive conduct); supra
notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
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right law satisfactorily to mediate between public and private interests."2 In this context, particular tensions arise when the exclusive right
to prepare derivative works is uncritically applied to digitalized productions of every kind.
1. The Derivative Work at Odds with Information Technologies
Viewed as literary works, low-authorship factual and functional
productions are entitled to all the exclusive rights of copyright law, including the right to prepare derivative works. This right enables an author to recoup revenues generated from different uses of his or her
work on each of the market segments where its expressive features are
commercially exploited either in original or adapted form.83 Protecting
derivative rights helps to allay risk aversion by encouraging the orderly
development of adaptations without harming the author's market interest in the underlying work8 4 and without unduly reducing the incentives
to produce it. 85 It is worth adding that the recent expansion of derivative work rights in United States law has helped to align the "copyright" countries and the "authors' rights" countries without necessarily
sacrificing the utilitarian ethos to which the former subscribe. 8
Almost by definition, low-authorship factual and functional productions contain little or no personal expression, which negates the
classical justification for a strong adaptation right. This factor, plus
the public interest in encouraging free use of the underlying facts or
ideas that comprise the bulk of these productions,8 8 traditionally induced leading United States federal courts to limit their protection to

82. See, e.g., Samuelson, CONTU Revisited, supra note 43, at 727-54; Patterson & Joyce,
supra note 18, at 792-813; Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protectionfor
Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045 (1989). See generally COMPUTER SCIENCE AND
TELECOMMUNICATIONS

BOARD. NATIONAL

RESEARCH COUNCIL, NATIONAL

ACADEMY

OF SCI-

43-93 (1991) [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ISSUES IN SOFTWARE]; LaST Frontier Conference Report on Copyright Protection of
Computer Software, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 15 (1989) (consensus statement by ten law professors)
[hereinafter cited as Conference Report].
83. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103, 106(2) (1988); 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 10, at 32-37.
84. See, e.g., David Ladd, The Harm of the Concept of Harm in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SoC'Y 421, 431 (1983); Landes & Posner, supra note I1,at 325, 354-55.
85. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 1912-13; see also Reichman, Realist's Approach,
supra note 16, at 946-47 (citing authorities for and against the role of copyright law in reducing
high risk aversion incurred by those whose livelihood depends on the dissemination of cultural
products).
86. See, e.g. RICKETSON. supra note 22, at 286-87, 293-95, 398-400; WIPO GUIDE. supra
note 30, at 76-77; 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 10, §§ 7.1.2, 7.3.2.
87. See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 16; Ginsberg, supra note 1, at 1881-93 (acknowledging
and criticizing the classical rationale); supra note 16.
88. See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, Infringement of Copyright in Computer Programs, 47 U.
PITT. L. REV. 1119 (1986); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 989-92
(1990) (noting judicial ambivalence in cases concerning directories); supra note 28 and accompaPublished
by eCommons, 1991
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literal copying only. 9 The judicial treatment of electronic information
processing should logically have conformed to these precedents. In reality, some recent decisions concerning maps, telephone directories, business lists, and commercial data bases actually prevented competitors
from using preexisting compilations as starting points to save time,
money, and effort, or from exploiting disparate factual contents of preexisting works in creating different and sometimes noncompeting
works." Similarly, other recent decisions concerning computer programs may indirectly have protected ideas, processes, systems, and
other ineligible matter 9 by grafting a broad reading of the exclusive
reproduction rights, especially the right to prepare derivative works,
onto the sibylline definition of computer programs added to section 101
of the Copyright Act in 1980.92
Section 101 defines computer programs as a "set of statements or
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to

nying text; see also L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. I
(1987).
89. See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Ill S. Ct. 1282, 1289-90
(1991); Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Cooling Sys. & Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radiator, Inc., 777 F.2d 485, 491-92 (9th Cir. 1985) (narrow range of protectible expression in factual works); Financial Info. Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., Inc., 751
F.2d 501, 504-05 (2d Cir. 1984); Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d
485, 488-89 (9th Cir.) (similarity of expression must be nearly verbatim to infringe copyright in
factual works), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984); Continental Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 253
F.2d 702 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958). See also HR. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 56-57 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670-71 (Copyright law "does not
preclude others from using the ideas or information revealed by the author's work").
90. See supra note 38 (citing selected cases favoring broader protection of factual works);
see generally Ginsburg, supra note 1,at 1903-07 (citing authorities prior to Feist and ascribing
"broader scope of protection for gathered facts" to "the ease with which computers may copy and
reorganize information, . . . [which] deprives the compiler of a meaningful incentive to production"). In principle, Feist should have halted this trend, partly by disallowing copyright protection
for noncreative compilations, mainly by adopting the "thin" copyright doctrine. Feist, I II S. Ct.
at 1289-95. See infra note 113.
91. See, e.g., Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Labs, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.
1986) (broad copyright protection for elements of structure, sequence, and organization), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240
(3d Cir. 1983); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990)
(protecting menu command structure of computer spreadsheet program, including the choice of
command terms, the structure and order of these terms, and long prompts, despite evidence of
standardization and functional efficiencies); Manufacturing Technologies Inc. v. Cams, Inc., 706
F. Supp. 984 (D. Conn. 1989); Digital Communications Assocs., Inc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp.,
659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987). But see Plains Cotton Cooperative Assoc. v. Goodpasture
Computer Service, Inc., 807 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 80 (1987) (sequence
and organization not protectible when largely determined by market factors).
92. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 (definitions of computer programs and derivative works), 103,
106(2) (1988); Software Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10(b), '94 Stat. 3015,
3028 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1988)); see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (excluding ideas, systems, processes, discoveries and the like).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/8
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bring about a certain result." 9 3 The same section defines a compilation
as "a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting
materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such
a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of
authorship."9 Most computer programs and many computerized data
bases evolve through revision, adaptation, and transformation into an
array of applications that are functionally "derived" from the data and
instructions embodied in the programmer's and/or compiler's initial solution."6 By persuading courts to overextend the exclusive right to prepare derivative works, copyright owners can assert proprietary claims
to any subsequent innovations that exploit recognizable aggregates of
the original data and instruction sets, even though the matter claimed
to have been infringed contains virtually no personal expression and
fulfills' purely functional objectives.9"
When courts further implement this protectionist version of the
adaptation right by relying on the impressionistic tests of copyright infringement used in some jurisdictions, they may extend protection beyond the modest quantum of "originality" that sections 102(a) and 103
require and directly invest first comers with colorable claims to nonprotectible matter.9 7 Whatever purpose the "total concept and feel" test
serves in cases adjudicating the unauthorized reproduction of personalized literary and artistic expression, 8 it becomes a contradiction in
terms when applied to low-authorship factual and functional productions whose market value depends primarily on their informational contents or their utilitarian behavior.99 Undue judicial reliance on this and

93.
94.
95.

17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
ld.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
See, e.g., Jaap H. Spoor, Expert Systems and Copyright, in ADVANCED TOPICS OF LAW
AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 93, 101-03 (G.P.V. VANDENBERGHE ed., 1989); Michael
Gemignani, Copyright Protection: Computer-Related Dependent Works, 15 RUTGERS COMPUTER
& TECH. L.J. 383, 383-87 (1989).
96. See supra notes 90-92; Samuelson, supra note 19; Patterson & Joyce, supra note 18, at
775-76; see also Paul Goldstein, General Report: Computer-Assisted and Computer-Generated
Creation of Literary and Artistic Works, in INFORMATIQUE ET LE DROIT D'AUTEUR 439, 442-43
(1990) (proceedings of the ALAI Congress, Quebec, Canada, Sept. 26-30, 1989) [hereinafter
General Report].
97. For the different tests of copyright infringement that U.S. courts currently apply, see
Reichman, Realist's Approach, supra note 16, at 957-58, 957 nn.94 & 95. For a thorough and
accurate explanation of these tests and how they should be applied, see generally 2 GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 10, at 3-38.
98. See, e.g., Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1358-60 (9th Cir. 1990); Sid & Marty
Kroft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977); Roth Greeting
Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970). The "total concept and feel" test
"bears more directly on consumer reactions to two competing works and should be inquired into
only after a threshold judgment has been-made on similarities in protected subject matter." 2
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 10, at 68 n.15.
99.bySee
e.g., Conference
Published
eCommons,
1991Report, supra note 82, at 18-23, 27-28.
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other impressionistic criteria in a nonaesthetic milieu 0 0 proves especially harmful when the "sets of instructions" or the "collections of
data" at issue pertain to functionally efficient or standardized solutions
that prudent second comers will prefer to work around in order to forestall actions for infringement.10 1 Carried to an extreme, the very process of standardization needed for the progress of artificial intelligence' °2 could enable early generations of programmers and systems
analysts to lodge derivative work claims against those who use the unpatented prior art as components or building blocks in later, more advanced achievements.10 3
In contrast, when electronic information bundles are viewed as intangible tools, the broad reproduction and adaptation rights of copyright law conflict with the traditional rights of both competitors and
users under basic principles of industrial property law. As previously
demonstrated, unpatentable handtool designs were relegated to either
free competition or utility model laws that operated on patent principles, including the principle of exhaustion. 0 4 Once manufacturers sold
protected handtools on the open market, they normally retained no further control over the uses to which their innovative functional designs
were put, and third parties who improved upon these designs were almost never viewed as infringers. In this way, the legal protection of handtool designs historically bestowed no more than a minimum
amount of lead time on innovators, and it deliberately fostered "se-

100. "As with the analysis of copyright protection for nonliteral elements of program code
. . . the use of terms such as 'structure, sequence, and organization," 'look and feel,' or 'total
concept and feel' obscures rather than assists in the application of copyright principles to software
interfaces." Conference Report, supra note 82, at 27.
101. See, e.g., Menell, supra note 82, at 1082 (concluding that "the Whelan rule makes it
difficult for others wishing to market programs performing the same task as the first comer to
perform it as effectively" and thus "enables first comers to 'lock up' basic programming techniques"); Samuelson, supra note 45. See also Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright, Computer Software,
and the New Protectionism, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 33, 34-36, 62-96 (1987).
102. See THE COMPUTER SCIENCE AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS BOARD, COMMISSION ON
PHYSICAL SCIENCES, MATHEMATICS, AND APPLICATIONS, KEEPING THE U.S. COMPUTER INDUSTRY
COMPETITIVE: SYSTEMS INTEGRATION 62-67 (1992) [hereinafter SYSTEMS INTEGRATION].

103. Cf L. Thorne McCarty, Artificial Intelligence and Intellectual Property Law: Some
Problematical Examples, in WIPO SYMPoSIUM, supra note 46, at 31, 33-36; Andy JohnsonLaird, Main Categories of Artificial Intelligence and Their Intellectual Property Aspects, in
WIPO SYMPOSIUM, supra, note 46 at 45-53; Randall Davis, Intellectual Property and Software:
The Assumptions Are Broken, in WIPO SYMPOSIUM, supra, note 46 at 101-20. See also Jaap H.
Spoor, Protecting Expert Systems, in Particular Expert System Knowledge: A Challenge for
Lawyers, in WIPO SYMPOSIUM, supra, note 46, at 77-84; Thomas K. Dreier, Intellectual Property
Aspects of Artificial Intelligence, in WIPO SYMPOSIUM, supra note 46, at 151-67.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 68-70; see also CORNISH, supra note 33, at 199-
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quential and cumulative improvements" by virtue of its much narrower
doctrine of equivalents.10 5
It does not necessarily follow that utility model laws, or even a
modified patent approach, offer a satisfactory solution to present-day
problems of protecting electronic information tools, although some
commentators take this position." 6 On the contrary, there is reason to
believe that new technologies in general, and electronic information
processing in particular, would benefit most from a new approach
whose primary purpose was simply to provide innovators with artificial
lead time in which to recoup their investments. 0 7 Nevertheless, the historical perspective suggests that a need to provide creators of electronic
information tools with adequate investment incentives does not necessarily entail recognition of derivativeownership rights in posterior innovation that users develop with the aid of such tools. Nor should legal
incentives to innovate unduly impair the ability of second comers to
enhance the efficiency of these same tools. Although the modalities for
compensating electronic toolmakers for their innovative contributions
may have to be adapted to fit particular applications, the properties of
digitalization facilitate such adjustments. None of the foreseeable re':muneration problems justifies any derogation from the goal of compensating the toolmaker for the behavioral impact of the tool itself rather
:than for putative "adaptations" of its constituent parts that result from
using the tool for its intended purpose.10 8
At present, those who exploit the dual nature of most factual and
functional productions take great pains to obscure the utilitarian character of these so-called "literary works."' 0 9 This breeds considerable
tension with the' pristine goals of literary and artistic property law. Un-

105. See Karjala, supra note 101, at 39; supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text (narrow
range of equivalents under utility model regimes).
106. See, e.g., Higashima & Ushiku, supra note 59; Sabbath, supra note 59; see generally
Kingston, supra note 6, at 35-86 (discussing his proposed modified patent regime and that of
Kronz). Utility models are firmly established in international industrial property law. See Paris
Convention, supra note 22, arts. 1(2), 4, 5.
107. See Reichiian, Legal Hybrids, supra note 50, part III;
see also infra notes 224-26 and
accompanying text.
108. See Davis, supra note 103, at 113-17. Cf. L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT-A LAW OF USERS' RIGHTS 191-94 (1991)
(criticizing publishers' pressures to restrict users' rights even as to literary and artistic works traditionally covered
by copyright law); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphosis of "Authorship." 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 493-96 (criticizing judicial tendency to romanticize the "authorship"
of derivative rights owners at the expense of those "who merely rework prior art - no matter how
ably").
109. See, e.g., Anthony L. Clapes, Patrick Lynch & Mark R. Steinberg, Silicon Epics and
Binary Bards: Determining the ProperScope of Copyright Protectionfor Computer Programs, 34
UCLA L.REV. 1493 (1987); Morton David Goldberg, Copyright Protectionfor Artificial Intelligence Systems,
in WIPO SYMPOSIUM,
supra note 46, at 55-75; see also Arthur R. Miller, CoinPublished
by eCommons,
1991
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like patent law, which allows second comers freely to use all unpatented innovations, the amorphous nature of copyright protection and
the powerful reproduction rights it triggers encourage any information
engineer whose nominal quantum of "authorship" overlaps that of
others working in the same field to lodge complaints about "copying"
that look tenable and are costly to defend. 110 Whether the United
States Supreme Court's recent decisions in Feist"' and Bonito Boats"2
will curb this trend toward overprotection remains to be seen. Properly
interpreted, these precedents suggest that copyright law should never
afford borderline factual and functional works more than "thin" protection against wholesale appropriation of surface expression."' Moreover, there is no conflict with the copyright owner's market interest in
derivative works so long as users apply the original works to the purposes for which they were purchased or second comers take unprotectible information or utilitarian features without duplicating that
same surface expression. 1
The federal judiciary's willingness to heed the message implicit in
these two Supreme Court decisions cannot be taken for granted. The

puters and Authorship: The Copyrightability of Computer-Generated Works, in WIPO SYMPOSiUM, supra note 46, at 241-70.
110. Cf Dennis S. Karjala, United States Adherence to the Berne Convention and Copyright Protection of Information-Based Technologies, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 147, 149-50 (1988) (stating that advances in software design are always similar to prior works); Peter S. Menell, Tailoring
Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1339-46 (1987) (stressing dangers of legal protection for product standards).
11.

Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Ill S. Ct. 1282 (1991).

112. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 159-64 (1989) (appearing to invest a competitor's right to reverse engineer unpatented, noncopyrightable products with
constitutional underpinnings).
113. See. e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 10, at 197 (citing pre-Feist authorities to the same
effect). For evidence that the message of Feist has been heard, see, e.g., Key Publications v.
Chinatown Today Publishing Enters., 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991); Sem-Torq, Inc. v. K Mart
Corp., 936 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1991); Victor Lalli Enters. v. Big Red Apple, Inc., 936 F.2d 671
(2d Cir. 1991). However, subtle and ingenious efforts to circumscribe Feist and broaden the scope
of copyright protection for computerized data bases are also evident. See, e.g., Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing v. Donnelley Info. Publishing, 933 F.2d 952 (1lth Cir. 1991) (yellow pages
protectible and infringed by licensee who used plaintiff's data to develop own directory; court
emphasizes appropriation of "format" and "coordinated" data); Kregos v. The Associated Press,
937 F.2d 700, 707-09 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding sufficient creativity in selection of categories for
baseball pitching form and implying that competitors could not copy that same format even if
based on outcome predictive statistical selection); see also United States Payphones, Inc. v. Executives Unlimited of Durham, Inc., 18 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 2049 (4th Cir. 1991) (unpublished).
114. See generally MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
13.03 (rev. ed. 1990); Reichman, supra note 5, at 693, 693 n.288 (clarifying and interpreting
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879)).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/8
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quantum of creative authorship that Feist requires remains modest,1 15
while the Court's disinclination to allow a modestly creative selection
and arrangement to pervade the assembled data has yet to be tested. 1
Given the current judicial preoccupation with setting innovation policy
above the application of statutory and traditional copyright principles, 1 7 one cannot assume that courts adjudicating future actions for
the infringement of functional works will more readily absorb the
teachings of the factual works cases than in the past. 1 8
To the extent that both Feist and Bonito Boats fail to halt a reckless protectionist trend, manufacturers of electronic information tools
stand to obtain patent-like protection on soft conditions for a very long
period of time, even though innovation in information science occurs
through "sequential and cumulative improvements." '1 9 If these restraints on trade, which cannot be squared with the traditional justifications for an intellectual property system, are carried over to computer-generated productions and to the outputs of artificial intelligence
machines, it will compound the resulting social disutilities 20 In the
long run, overprotection on this scale will suffocate the very incremental innovation that copyright law was summoned to promote, 12 ' and it
will harm even the oligopolistic firms that have lobbied so hard to procure it.

115. See Feist, I ll S. Ct. at 1287 ("the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a
slight amount will suffice"), 1296 (stressing nonmechanical or nonroutine selection and
arrangement).
116. For indications that some federal appellate courts may resist the "thin" copyright logic
in response to subjective and poorly articulated notions of piracy, see supra note 113.
117. Courts following the Whelan line of decisions feel impelled to set innovation policy
above the application of statutory and traditional copyright principles. See, e.g., Conference Report, supra note 82 (criticizing Whelan and applying traditional copyright principles to computer
programs). In contrast, the Supreme Court in Feist deliberately avoided questions concerning the
socially desirable level of competition for factual compilations. Ill S. Ct. at 1289-90 ("It may
seem unfair that much of the fruit of the compiler's labor may be used by others without compensation . . .[but] this is . . . 'the essence of copyright' . . . and a constitutional requirement"); see
also id., at 1292, n* (stating that the Supreme Court's misappropriation decision in International
News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) was "not relevant here"); Patterson &
Joyce, supra note 18, at 757-81.
118. Until Feist, courts responsible for the maxi-protectionist trend in the computer program cases, such as Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Labs, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3rd Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1031 (1987), took pains to ignore both the "thin copyright" tradition
of the functional works milieu and the "narrow range of protection" tradition of the factual works
cases. See generally Reichman, Realist's Approach, supra note 16, at 966-76.
119. Karjala, supra note 110; see generally Reichman, supra note.5, at 683-89 (" 'Originality' and the Burdens of Overlapping Claims").
120. See infra text accompanying notes 190-217.
121. Because it is difficult to separate basic from applied research in this field, the exercise
of overly broad and exclusive reproduction rights at the application phase can fuel claims of infringement having serious repercussions at a more theoretical level. See further Reichman, supra
note 5, at 686-70.
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Applying the logic of utility model laws to electronic information
processing thus helps to explain why application of the full copyright
paradigm to technological innovation eventually becomes a self-defeating proposition. The tool concept of industrial property law also sheds
considerable light on the uncertain status of small change literary productions even in the pre-digital world of copyright law. 2 A benign
tolerance of these "works" in that halcyon period violated cardinal
principles of artistic property law by protecting functional tools masquerading as literary works. In this respect, copyright protection of
computer programs as literary works merely converted yesterday's
"small change" anomalies into the "big bucks" anomalies of today.
The difference is that electronic information processing constitutes the
engine of twenty-first century economic development, and powerful lobbies are no longer satisfied with the "thin" protection meted out in the
past.
2. The Public Interest at Odds with the Two-Party Deal
If the invention of the printing press created a market for literary
and artistic works that could be reproduced in copies, it also ended the
ability of authors and publishers to control the utilization of their published works by means of two-party contractual agreements. 12 3 In effect, copyright law established a surrogate form of ownership by instituting a system of portable fences, valid against the world and backed
by the power of the state, that accompany an author's creation on its
journey from mind to mind. 24 Even though third parties legitimately
exercise dominion over artifacts that embody original intellectual creations, these fictitious portable fences neutralize essential attributes of
property that possession would ordinarily confer. The exclusive right to
reproduce thus mandates a consensual relation between creator and
would-be exploiters that prevents the latter from using the former's
contribution in specified ways without paying for the privilege.' 2 5 This
right constitutes the essential element of intellectual property law, and

122. See supra text accompanying notes 22-32.
123. See, e.g., STEPHEN SAXBY, THE AGE OF INFORMATION 1-34 (1990); POLLAUD-DULIAN,
supra note 79, at 43-57, 106-08; Patterson & Joyce, supra note 18, at 791 n.240 ("Before the
invention of the printing press, the concept of a public domain would have made no sense").
124. J.H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in InternationalTrade: Opportunities and Risks
of a GATT Connection, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 747, 800-05 (1989) ("Portable Fences for an
Ubiquitous Estate") [hereinafter GATT Connection]. But see Palmer, supra note 11, at 288-302
(emphasizing alternatives to property rights, including "technological fences").
125. See, e.g., BENKO, supra note 7, at 17-18; Paul Roubier, UnitW et synthse des droits de
propritk industrielle, in ETUDES SUR LA PROPRIETE INDUSTRIELLE LITTERAIRE ARTISTIQUE: MELANGE MARCEL PLAISANT 161-65 (1960).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/8
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it gives intellectual creations the quality of "goods" in both the legal
and economic sense of the term.12
To this day, the market for literary and artistic works has been
127
able to develop and organize itself with a relative degree of efficiency
because states continue to "substitute . . .a statutory period of artificial lead time for the brief or negligible period of natural lead time that
competition in intellectual achievements otherwise tends to produce. 1 2
State intervention is not, however, without its costs. On the contrary,
authors' rights in particular are freighted with limitations and exceptions in the public interest that seriously undermine the specific efficiencies one expects property rights to produce. If, on one theory or
another, the nineteenth century vindicated the creators' rights to compensation for inventions and original works of authorship, the twentieth
century has witnessed the maturation of offsetting conditions that de29
fine and fortify the larger public interest.1
The fair use exception codified in United States copyright law 3 ' is
a prime manifestation of .this trend, although other Berne Union countries appear to define it less broadly than in domestic law.' 3' Fair use
disculpates certain unauthorized but socially beneficial uses either because transaction costs might otherwise stand in the way of negotiated
licenses 13 2 or because the resulting public benefit is thought to outweigh
the loss of private gain. 3 3 Moreover, the fair use exception perfects a
broader legislative denial of any exclusive right to use the copyrighted
work. In the United States, as in most Berne Union countries, the exclusive reproduction rights do not allow authors to control the end use

126. See, e.g., Roubier, supra note 125, at 164-65; Michael Lehmann, The Theory of Property Rights and the Protection of Intellectual and Industrial Property, 16 I.I.C. 525, 540 (1985).
127. See, e.g., Michael Lehmann, Property and Intellectual Property: Property Rights as
Restrictions on Competition in Furtheranceof Competition, 20 1..C. 1,10-11 (1989); Landes &
Posner, supra note 11,at 88; cf. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent
System, 20 J. LAW & ECON. 265 (1977). However, the protection of the author's personality
interest and the promotion of cultural policies often override considerations of efficiency, which is
only a relative, not an absolute goal of copyright law. See supra notes 16 & 79-80 and accompanying text.
128. Reichman, GATT Connection, supra note 124, at 803.
129. See, e.g., RICKETSON, supra note 22, 477-548 (limitations on artistic property rights
under Berne Convention); PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 108, at 132-33. See also Jean
Foyer, Problmes internationaux contemporains des brevets dinvention, in 171 DE L'ACADAMIE

340, 390-94 (1981) (public interest exceptions
recognized under the patent systems of all countries).
130. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, RECUEIL DES COuRs

131.

Compare, e.g., RICKETSON, supra note 22, at 479-89 with WILLIAM

F. PATRY. THE

(1985).
132. See generally Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structuraland Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 31 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 601 (1984).
FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW

133.

See 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 10, § 10.1.
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of their copyrighted works.13 4 The first-sale doctrine, which limits the
exclusive distribution right in United States law, expressly authorizes
those who purchase copies of protected works to use and dispose of
these copies without interference from the copyright owners. 3 '
From a different angle, one could argue that the idea-expression
1 36
doctrine constitutes the most fundamental exception of them all.
Apart from its role as a guarantor of free speech,13 7 this doctrine ensures an adequate level of competition through a built-in process of
''reverse engineering" that permits third-parties freely to use the facts
and ideas underlying clusters of related expression. In addition, both
domestic and international law recognize numerous exemptions and immunities for educational and social purposes, 3 8 including the imposition of compulsory licenses for recorded musical works and broadcasts.1 39 Still other limitations arise from the state's general exercise of
its police powers and from abuses of the statutory monopoly, whether
or not rising to the level of antitrust violations.141 In a few countries,
even the protection of moral rights assumes a public-interest character
by enabling state authorities to preserve the integrity of cultural goods
beyond the lifetime of their creators or, in the case of folklore, in the
absence of specifically identifiable authors. 4 '

134. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 11, at 588-89. Professor Brown states: "The right to control the use of a work, although granted to inventors, has never been part of copyright except as
performance may be considered 'use.' Indeed, the absence of a 'use right' helps to justify the
relatively casual approach to granting copyright as opposed to the more searching tests for patentability." See generally POLLAUD-DULIAN, supra note 79, 279-399 (noting subtle variations from
one national system to another).
135. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 109(a), 202 (1988). See generally John M. Kernochan, The Distribution Right in the United States of America: Review and Reflections, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1407
(1989). But see 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (rental rights reserved to owners of copyrighted sound recordings and computer programs); POLLAUD-DULIAN, supra note 79, 495-507 (advocating generalized
right to control end use of copyrighted works). See also 17 U.S.C. § 106A (Pub. L. 101-650, 104
Stat. 5128 (1990)) (moral rights of visual artists).
136. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988); see, e.g., Litman, supra note 88, at 977, 1015, 1023;
Brown, supra note 11, at 601-05.
137. See I NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 114, § 1.10.
138. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 108-120 (1988); Berne Convention, supra note 22, Arts.
2bis(2), 9(2), 10, lObis, I lbis(2), 13; RICKETSON, supra note 22, at 532-42 (implied exceptions
concerning public performance, broadcasting, recording, cinematographic, and translation rights).
139. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 110, I1, 115 (1988); Berne Convention, supra note 22, Arts.
I Ibis(2), 13.
140. See Berne Convention, supra note 22, art. 17; RICKETSON, supra note 22, at 542-48.
Cf. Raskind, supra note 12 (discussing bases in unfair competition law, misappropriation branch,
that condition a state's ability to prevent competitors from unfairly using a creator's intangible
production).
141. See, e.g., Berne Convention, supra note 22, arts. 6bis(2), 15; RICKETSON, supra note
22, at 3 13-15; but see Jaszi, supra note 108, at 496-500 (viewing moral rights as a form of private
censorship). See also Edward J. Damich, The Right of Personality:A Common Law Basis for the
Protection of the Moral Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REV. 1 (1988); Wendy J. Gordon, Toward
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The growing importance of electronic information tools, however,
threatens to undermine the balance of public and private interests
achieved in the past by restoring the publishers' power to subordinate
even the use of disseminated information to the terms of two-party contractual agreements. For example, to the extent that publishers supply
on-line information to a network of licensed subscribers from computerized and constantly updated data bases kept on their own premises,
they avoid the kind of dissemination in hard copies that made intellectual creations vulnerable to third-party appropriation in the past.' 42 By
the same token, publishers may also attempt to avoid the legal and
practical constraints that have hitherto combined to safeguard users'
interests.
The first-sale doctrine protects only a user who lawfully acquires
hard copies.14 Because subscribers entering any given data base must
log in and out, the proprietors' physical control over the data may enable them to charge for each and every use of electronically processed
information, even though the copyright law itself grants no exclusive
right to control either end use in general' 4 4 or the use of disparate facts
in particular. 5 Even when dissemination occurs in hard copy form,
such as a CD ROM, digital technology facilitates the control of end
use by enabling intermediate providers, such as libraries, to monitor
actual usage and by permitting originators to charge, directly or indirectly, for all uses. 4
These heightened powers of control enable publishers to monitor
and charge even for uses analogous to those customarily regarded as

a Jurisprudence of Benefits: The Norms of Copyright and the Problem of Private Censorship, 57
U. CHI. L. REV..1009 (1990).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 9-13; cf Patterson & Joyce, supra note 18, at 782
("The vital question today is whether the copyright law developed for the printing press remains
appropriate in an age of new and radically different communications technologies, such as the
computer"). Although dissemination in CD ROMS presumably remains subject to the first-sale
doctrine, assuming copyrightability, see 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 109(a) (1988), the need for updates
may impel users to accept the originator's licensing restrictions all the same.
143. See supra notes 135 & 142.
144. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
145. Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Ill S. Ct. 1282, 1289-90 (1991). Cf Ginsburg, supra note I, at 1916 (arguing that copyright incentives to compilers of data bases should
not include control over posterior recombinations of the data compiled, because "vesting this control in a single compiler would cut off'public access to new informational works that could be
generated from the data . . . but that the compiler declines to license.").
146. See Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 1619 n.209 (describing traditional collection practices
of The Copyright Clearance Center (CCC) and experimental technology of university microfilms,
known as BART (Billing and Royalty Tracking). Until refined monitoring techniques are perfected, however, surveillance of those who use libraries remains difficult, and there is a substantial
risk of downloading for commercial or competitive purposes. Id., at 1919-22. Users dependent on
compilers'
updates may 1991
have less freedom of action. See supra note 142.
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privileged under a regime of hard copy dissemination, such as the making of copies for personal use or for research purposes. 4 7 If the data
base in question satisfied the post-Feist requirements for copyright protection, 4 8 the traditional reluctance of both domestic and foreign law
to recognize fair use in unpublished works could subtlely reinforce such
practices." 9 To the extent that electronic information publishers still
need public and private libraries to broaden the diffusion of their products, moreover, whether on-line or in CD-ROMS, the publishers' natural monopoly enables them to impose and enforce harsh contractual
conditions more readily than when the same information appears in
publicly distributed printed copies. Licensing agreements may consequently require librarians to waive privileges that the copyright law
otherwise affords 5 ' and to limit users' access to copyrighted matter beyond what their own understanding of the fair use doctrine would require. 5 ' Aggressive licensing of electronic information tools could thus
distort the public service mission of libraries by making them involuntary collection agents for publishers.
Even without the involvement of libraries, widespread recourse to
the two-party deal creates tension between the providers' efforts to control each and every use of the electronically processed information and
the public's ability to foster certain socially beneficial uses of that same
information at acceptable costs.' 5 2 To the extent that fair use rests on a
market-failure rationale, as some commentators contend,' 53 electronic
information tools will reduce the kinds of transaction costs that have
traditionally justified much privileged use in the past.' 5 4 While new
transaction costs may nonetheless arise, especially if low-authorship
data bases are routinely denied any form of intellectual property pro-

147.

See, e.g., 17 U.S.C.

§

107 (1988);

PATTERSON

213 (distinguishing personal use from fair use);

&

RICKETSON,

note 108, at 193supra note 22, at 477-78.
LINDBERG;supra

148. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1988); New
Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
1168 (1990); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987); see most recently.Sega
Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1392 (N.D. Cal. 1992). See also RICKETSON.
supra note 22, at 488 (interpreting Berne Convention, supra note 22, art. 9(2)); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair's Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1137 (1990).
150. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1988).
151. Cf. PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 108, at 159, 181-90.
152. Cf., e.g., Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 914 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The scope of permissible fair use is greater with an informational work than a creative work."); Vault Corp. v. Quaid
Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 268-70 (5th Cir. 1988) (pre-empting "shrink wrap license" prohibiting copying or modification of computer programs by dint of 17 U.S.C. §§ 117, 301 (1988)).
153. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
154. See 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 10, § 10.1.1.
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tection whatsoever, 5 digital technology enhances the providers' opportunities for contractually extracting these costs from selected, identifiable users. Indeed, by facilitating implementation of the pay-per-use
principle on a scale hitherto unthinkable, computerization tends to reduce the need for the blanket licenses and collection agencies that other
copyright industries employ. 56 In effect, the electronic information
publisher becomes increasingly capable of serving as his own collection
society, subject to no consent decrees, no membership controls, and no
external regulation other than the threat of litigation for abuse of
copyright."'
The counterargument, of course, is that electronic monitoring
merely enables providers to put information to its most valuable uses
while eliminating hidden subsidies that distort the price-setting function of the market.' 58 This reasoning, however, downplays the extent to
which the state's initial willingness to enforce fictitious sets of portable
fences in regard to intangible intellectual creations was itself conditioned upon perpetual guarantees concerning access to the copyrighted
culture.' 59 It also ignores that both facts and ideas constitute cultural
building blocks that cannot be withdrawn from circulation or overly
taxed without impinging upon the future development of that same
culture. 160
It remains to be seen whether courts will enforce contractual provisions that unduly circumscribe users' rights and privileges that are
either rooted in the copyright statute or in analogous public policy considerations.'
In this regard, recent attempts to maximize the protection of undisclosed source codes for computer programs by combining
federal copyright protection with state trade secret laws constitute a
dangerous precedent.' 2 By the same token, judicial resistance to

155. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 1918-22 (fearing that publishers who cannot adequately track unauthorized third-party uses of their data will escalate the prices of authorized
uses to offset these losses plus the cost of self-help measures and/or collection agencies).
156. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
157. Cf. e.g., PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 108, at 182-86, 237.
158. Cf., e.g., Palmer, supra note 11; Breyer, supra note 11.
159. See supra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text; see also David Lange, Recognizing
the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 171-73 (1981).
161. Although courts do not lack authority to limit contractual provisions perceived to harm
the public interest, especially under the Second Restatement of Contracts, a judicial willingness to
take such steps often depends on the existence of statutes that express the relevant public policy
goals. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, §§ 178-79 (1981). Cf. id. §§ 181, 186.
162. See, e.g., Roger M. Milgrim, Trade Secret Law to Protect Computer Programs, paper
presented to the Conference on Significant Developments in Computer Law (1991), University of
Dayton (Ohio) School of Law, June 6, 1991; David Bender, Protection of Computer Programs:
The Copyright/Trade Secret Interface, 47 U. PITT L. REV. 907 (1986); see also John R. Harris, A
Market-Oriented Approach
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"shrink wrap" licensing of computer programs 16 3 may help to stimulate
the search for public policy constraints favoring libraries and, perhaps,
users of both factual and functional works in general. The Feist and
Bonito Boats decisions, taken together, could also reinforce users' appeals to the public policy exception in contracts law and to the doctrine
4
of abuse in intellectual property law."
Much depends on whether the reasoning of Feist will persuade the
federal courts to apply its "thin" copyright doctrine to computer programs, in keeping with the judicial treatment of functional works in the
past. 5 At present, one dares not presume that courts will uphold the
right of third parties to reproduce a computer program for purposes of
analyzing its unprotectible, technical ideas, even though this result is
mandated by the pristine teachings of Baker v. Selden, 66 by the doctrine of fair use as codified in section 107, and by the Supreme Court's
emphasis on reverse engineering in Bonito Boats."7 To the extent that
the federal judiciary fails to vindicate analytical use of nonprotectible
functional matter,16 8 it will indirectly abet the contractually imposed
destruction of public interest safeguards concerning factual matter that
electronic information tools make increasingly feasible.
Even if the federal appellate courts decided to resist encroachment
upon the public interest more strenuously in cases concerning copyrighted factual works than they'have in recent cases testing the scope

Software, 25 JURIMETRICS J. 147, 156-64 (1985); Stanislaw J. Soltysinski, Legal Protectionfor
Computer Programs, Public Access to Information and Freedom of Competitive Research and
Development Activities, 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L. J. 447, 448-50, 464-65 (1990).
163. See, e.g., Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 268-70 (5th Cir. 1988);
David W. Maher, The Shrink-Wrap License: Old Problems in a New Wrapper, 34 J. COPYRIGHT
Soc'y, 292 (1987). Cf Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 1920 ("A 'shrink wrap license' equivalent for a
CD Rom may not, absent a validating state statute, constitute an enforceable contract").
164. Cf. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 979 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding that
anticompetitive clauses in standard licensing agreement constituted misuse of copyright); 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 10, § 9.6.1 (suggesting that factual and functional works are likely candidates
for application of the misuse doctrine); 4 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 19.04 (1991) (discussing
better established doctrine of misuse in patent law). However, to the extent that the license agreements under attack covered matter left uncopyrightable by § 102(b) of the Copyright Act or by
Feist itself, there would be no copyright to misuse and the success of comparable arguments could
hinge on the public policy exception to contract enforcement. See supra note 161 and accompanying text; see also Maher, supra note 162, at 294-97 (discussing equitable servitude doctrine).
165. See supra notes 38 & 89 and accompanying text.
166. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988); Baker'v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (use of bookkeeping system set out in copyrighted literary work held not to infringe); see generally Reichman,
supra note 5, at 693 & n.288.
167. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 159-64 (1989); 17
U.S.C. § 107 (1988); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 10, § 5.2.1.4, at 85-91 (Supp. 1992); see also
Reichman, Realist's Approach, supra note 16, at 960 n. 110, 970-73.
168. See, e.g., Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1392 (N.D. Cal. 1992)
(intermediate copies for purposes of achieving compatibility were not fair use).
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of protection for computer programs,16 the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Feist could inadvertently undermine the potential
strength of this resistance. By placing low-authorship compilations of
data that fail to meet a constitutionally imposed standard of creativity
outside the statutory framework,17 this decision ostensibly frees publishers of such productions from the public-interest exceptions copyright law otherwise mandates.
The Feist decision could thus aggravate a dilemma that already
plagues policymakers concerned about the legal protection of electronic
information tools. On the one hand, Feist raises legitimate fears that
compilers who disseminate information in hard copies may suffer from
a chronic state of underprotection that discourages investment. These
fears follow from the compiler's inability to prevent third parties from
freely exploiting data contained in those compilations that remain
copyrightable,1 7 ' as well as from the originator's inability to obtain any
copyright protection at all for data bases that lack the requisite quantum of creativity. This risk of underprotection, in turn, invites legislative tinkering that could either further distort the carefully balanced
mechanisms of the mature copyright paradigm 17 or add another ad
hoc solution to an already overcrowded intellectual property scaffold. 173
On the other hand, the Feist decision may paradoxically heighten
the power of those electronic publishers who remain relatively immune
from third-party appropriation to maintain real fences around the information they gather without having to invoke the imaginary portable
fences of intellectual property law. 174 In this context, nonprotectible information will not simply escheat to the public domain in keeping with
the Supreme Court's tacit assumption about unpatented innovation in
Bonito Boats. 75 Rather, noncopyrightable information could become
the object of contractually imposed forms of overprotection that are

169. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
170. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Ill S. Ct. 1282, 1287-90 (1991).
171. See generally OTA REPORT, supra note 2, at 74-77; Denicola, supra note 18.
172. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 1924-36 (advocating the expansion of copyright
subject matter and scope in favor of low authorship factual Works, in order to avoid underprotection; but also advocating compulsory collective licensing to avoid overprotection); see also Colin
Tapper, An Aspect of Copyright in Data Bases, 14 N. KY. L. REV. 169, 209-10 (1987) (arguing
that changes in copyright law to accommodate the quirks of electronic information processing
distort the careful balance copyright law has developed for more traditional works of authorship).
173. See generally J. H. Reichman, ProprietaryRights in the New Landscape of Intellectual Property Law: An Anglo-American Perspective,-CoLuM. VLA J.L & ARTs-(forthcoming
1992) [hereinafter ProprietaryRights!.
174. See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text; cf. Palmer, supra note I1, at 288-89
(arguing that proprietary rights reduce incentives to the development of technological fencing
mechanisms that would impede free-riding with less distortion to free trade).
See supra notes
5, 24 & 81 and accompanying text.
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potentially more insidious in the long run than chronic states of underprotection stemming from 6the compilers' inability to appropriate the
17
fruits of their own labors.
This dilemma has kindled interest in early efforts by the Nordic
countries to protect low-authorship compilations under a sui generis approach.177 The Nordic "catalogue rule," as it is known, provides shortterm copyright-like protection for compilations that fail to satisfy the
normal threshold requirements of copyright law.178 It prohibits slavish
reproduction, in whole or in part, of "catalogues, tables and similar
compilations in which a large number of particulars have been summarized" for a period of ten years from the date of first publication. 7 9
The Nordic catalogue rule, however, adopted prior to the digital
revolution, reportedly fails to prevent competitors from reusing or
remanipulating the compiler's factual contents as such.18 0 In contrast,
the Commission of the European Communities has proposed a modified
version of the Nordic catalogue rule that provides stronger protection
8
for derivative works.' '
Many Berne Union Countries already regulate the contractual
provisions that publishers may impose upon authors generally, with a
view toward bolstering the latter's characteristic lack of bargaining

176. Cf. OTA REPORT, supra note 2, at 163 (stressing increased transaction costs of distributing information that are likely to flow from either technical or contractual fence building); Ginsburg, supra note 1,at 1922-24 (noting potential for high prices and undesirable transaction costs
if compilers obtain full copyright protection); Patterson & Joyce, supra note 18, at 792 (stressing
need to "enhance access to the public domain for users of computerized research tools").
177. See, e.g., Gunnar Karnell, The Nordic Catalogue Rule, in PROTECTING WORKS OF
FACT 67-72 (E. J. Dommering & P. Bernt Hugenholtz, eds. 1991); Agne Henry Olsson & Karin
Hokborg, The Nordic Countries, in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS 468,
475 (S. Stewart 2d ed. 1989).
178. Karnell, supra note 177, at 67 (quoting § 49 of the Swedish Copyright Act of 1960).
According to Professor Karnell, the aim is "to protect enterprises that have spent capital and work
on the production of a product of the kind from plagiarism and ensuing unfair competition by
means of unwarranted reproductions". Id. at 70.
179. See Karnell, supra note 177, at 68, 70 (stating that, as a neighboring right, eligibility
under the catalogue rule turns on the compiler's industrious effort and investment, rather than on
the creativity manifested in personal expression; and conceding that this regime equates unauthorized duplication with a type of unfair competition). Cf. Leo J. Raskind, The Continuing Process
of Refining and Adapting Copyright Principles, 14 COLUM.-VLA J.OF L. & ARTS 125 (1990)
(arguing case for use of unfair competition law to protect information against slavish duplication).
180. See, e.g., Karnell, supra note 177, at 70-71; Ginsburg, supra note 1,at 1924 n.223
(citing the relevant provisions of the Nordic copyright laws that recognize this neighboring right;
and criticizing these regimes, established in the 1950s and 1960s, because they do not appear to
have anticipated electronic data bases, which permit "easy access to myriad data for copying or
remanipulation").
181. See EC Proposed Directive, supra note 35, Arts. 2(5) (proposing a right "to prevent
the unauthorized extraction or re-utilization, from that [protected] database, of its contents, in
whole or substantial part, for commercial purpose"), 8(l) (compulsory license for extraction of
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/8
contents when publisher is sole source).

19921

ELECTRONIC INFORMATION

power.' 8 1 Moreover, the licensing of information as commercial and industrial know-how is subject to stringent legislative and administrative
sanctions in the European Community' and to a combination of legislative and judicially contrived limitations in the United States. 84 It
seems logical to predict that analogous legislative and judicial constraints will become a necessary adjunct of any short-term solution to
the puzzle of factual works-whether sounding in copyright law or in a
neighboring right-in order to define and defend the larger public in-'
terest in access to information. 85
From a broader perspective, all the problems brought to light in
the foregoing discussion underscore the need to conceptualize electronic
information processing as a special kind of tool whose outputs fit imperfectly within the classical intellectual property system. The resulting
systemic tensions will grow steadily more acute as distinctions between
"data" and "computer program, ' "1 6 or even between "theoretical" and
"applied" science, further break down. 87 Under these conditions, an
innovator's ability to attract venture capital to cutting-edge technolo-

182.

See, e.g., Dietz, supra note 29; Robert Plaisant, France, § 4[3] in INTERNATIONAL
(Paul E. Geller rev. ed. 1990); Mario Fabiani, Italy, § 4[3] in

COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE

id. See also MARINA SANTILLI. IL DIRITTO D'AUTORE NELLA SOCIETA DELL'INFORMAZIONE 264-

303 (1988).
183.

See generally, J. PAGENBERG &. B. GEISSLER, LIZENZ-VERTRAGE -

LICENSE AGREE-

1989 (setting out the Regulations of the EC Commission on the application of Art. 85(3)
of the Treaty of Rome to know-how agreements (Appendix 3) plus relevant German law); HansWerner Moritz, Assignment of Computer Software for Use on a Data Processing System and the
Applicability of Know-How Licensing Rules, 21 1.I.C.
799 (1990); see also H. Cohen Jehoram et
al., The Law of the EEC and Copyright, in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE
(Paul E. Geller rev. ed. 1990); Japanese Fair Trade Commission, Japan: Guidelines for the Regulation of Unfair Trade Practices with Respect to Patent and Know-How Licensing Agreements,
21 I.IC. 662 (1990).
184. See, e.g., I R. M. MILGRIM. MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS §§ 6.05, 10.01, 11.01[2]
(1989).
185. Cf EC Proposed Directive, supra note 35, Art. 8 (proposing compulsory license for
extraction of data from sole-source data base in addition to exemption for the use of insubstantial
portions thereof).
186. See, e.g., Allan Newell, The Models Are Broken, The Models are Broken!, 47 U.
PITT. L. REV. 1023, 1033 (1986) (stating that "the boundary between data and program-that is,
what is data and what is procedure-is very fluid. In fact, .
there is no principled distinction in
terms of form or representation of which is which.").
187. See, e.g., Newell, supra note 186, at 1026, 1033 (stating that "[a]ll of computer science is directly related to use. There is essentially no gap, no matter how pure or basic the science
is"); Rebecca Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 195 (1987) (stating that, in biotechnology, "the traditional dividing line
between basic and applied research is blurred. Not only has the historical time lag between the
two collapsed, but it has become difficult to characterize given research problems as belonging in
one category
or the other").
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gies will require an integrated proprietary regime not yoked to pre-digital subject matter distinctions that have become empirically obsolete.1 88
The long-term solution to most of the problems plaguing the legal
protection of electronic information processing resides in a law to protect know-how as such. 18 9 A complete discussion of this topic must
await another occasion. In the meantime, scholars and policymakers
concerned about the regulation of industrial literature in the broader
context of innovation law should look beyond the short-term interests of
sectoral lobbies seeking temporary competitive advantages. In so doing,
they must not neglect to develop a set of appropriate public interest
safeguards that two-party agreements to exploit electronic information
tools cannot override.
III.

INFORMATION AS APPLIED SCIENTIFIC

KNOw-How

The tool concept of industrial property law further clarifies certain
proprietary issues that have emerged from widespread use of computeraided design. It also provides a springboard for analyzing the intellectual property aspects of artificial intelligence systems, although a satisfactory resolution of these issues will require a more complex conceptual framework than the classical intellectual property system currently
provides.
A.

Outputs of Computer-Aided Design

The rapid diffusion of computer-aided design (CAD) throughout
all manufacturing sectors 90 dramatically evidences the dual nature of
electronic information processing. 19 1 It further shows the extent to
which misapplications of copyright law to technical innovation can produce intolerable restraints on trade. If, for example, one characterizes
the legal status of computer-aided design as a function of the underlying computer programs, then the logic of copyright protection for liter-

188: See, e.g., Newell, supra note 186, at 1033 ("What counts is the total body of knowledge represented somehow in the assembled symbolic expressions. This totality determines the
ultimate behavior of the machine .... ");Davis, supra note 103, at 108-111 ("Software is a
'machine' whose medium of construction happens to be 'text' "); see also Pamela Samuelson, Digital Media and the Changing Face of Intellectual Property Law, 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER &
TECH. L.J. 323 (1990).
189. See generally Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 50; Reichman, supra note 5, at
656-67, 714-18; infra notes 218-25 and accompanying text.
190. See, e.g., SAXBY, supra note 123, at 185-92; D. 0. UGHANWA & M. J. BAKER, THE
ROLE OF DESIGN IN INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS 277-95 (1989) ("The Impact of Computers on Design"). Computer Aided Design (CAD) "provides a screen-based 'electronic' drawing
board for designers to work with. Essentially, the user can produce a drawing on screen by instructing the computer to produce the lines and curves, either through keyboard entry or with the
aid of a 'light pen' or 'mouse'." SAXBY, supra note 123, at 185.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/8
191. See supra notes 28-44 & 109 and accompanying text.
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ary works invites originators of the programs to lodge colorable proprietary claims to products developed with their aid. On this reasoning,
the computer-generated design embodied in the end product could, to
some extent, constitute a work derived from the instructions that comprise the program."' 2 Claims that users and programmers jointly created the end product might also be advanced.19 a
If, instead, one assimilates computer-aided design to the legal protection of tools as historically conceived, then basic principles of. industrial property law reviewed earlier in this article counteract the toolmaker's claims to proprietary rights in the user's end products.19 4 From
this perspective, copyright law governs only the specialized market for
literary and artistic works. It should never distort the general products
market ruled by the patent paradigm.19 1
What counts on the market for CAD technology is the potential
value to be added by users who apply these tools to the task of making
better products at more competitive prices.1 96 No matter how refined
the initial programmer's technical contribution may be, outputs flowing
from the use of computer-aided design typically compete on the general
products market. Moreover, a user's decision to purchase the relevant
CAD technology will seldom depend on its embodiment of a programmer's personal expression. Nor will the industrial user normally expect
computer-aided design to enhance the imprint of his own personality
19 7
upon the end product.
The toolmaker should accordingly derive his or her reward from
the sale price of the tool or from licensing fees, but not from valueadding uses to which the innovative tool is put. 98 The outputs of computer-aided design, once allocated to the user of a tool and not to its
maker, must then seek protection according to their variable natures
under whatever intellectual property regimes happen to apply. The
computer-aided design of a sweater, for example, may qualify for protection under the ornamental design laws of the Benelux countries or
under the unregistered design right of the United Kingdom. It may

192. See supra text accompanying notes 83-96.
193. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (definition of "joint work"); Samuelson, supra note 19.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 60-78.
195. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text; see also Reichman, Legal Hybrids,
supra note 50 (Part 1).
196. Cf Samuelson, supra note 19, at 1205-09.
197. For the characteristic emphasis of copyright law on an author's personal expression,
see supra note 23 and accompanying text.
198. The toolmaker may, of course, enhance his or her own reward if the tool embodies
innovations that qualify for protection under patent laws, utility model laws, the Semiconductor
Chip Protection Act of 1984 and its progeny in foreign law, or even a functional design law like
that recently enacted in the United Kingdom. See, e.g., CORNISH, supra note 33, at 384-91.
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even qualify for protection under copyright law in France or under increasingly protectionist applications of section 43(a) of the United
199
States Trademark Act to unregistered "appearance trade dress."
Courts should, however, resist proprietary theories that seek to link the
outputs of computer-aided design with the inputs of electronic information tools so long as the tool manufacturers add comparatively little
value to the users' end products in relation to that added by the users
themselves.
B.

Artificial Intelligence as Semi-Autonomous Know-How Machines

Commercial applications of artificial intelligence systems already
combine knowledge-based processing with task-oriented processing in
00 While a
structurally integrated blocks of computer programming.
thorough analysis of the intellectual property problems these systems
20 1 it must be acknowledged
raise is beyond the scope of this article,
that the tool concept sheds less light on their resolution than it did on
questions concerning small-change literary works or the outputs of
computer-aided design. This follows because artificial intelligence systems are, by definition, capable of semi-autonomous forms of discernment. 2 One can already envision applications in which both the maker
and user keep adding inputs to achieve system-determined outputs that
greatly exceed the individual contributions of either. At the limit, while
both maker and user continue to input valuable information, the artifibulk of any new or additional
cial intelligence device may itself add2 the
03
value to previously available outputs.
The legal evaluation of these phenomena, complex at best, is
greatly handicapped by the unsettled status of patents for computer
program-related inventions and by the skewed empirical data this lack
of consensus has produced. 04 Until the patent authorities adopt con-

199. See generally, Reichman, supra note 10, 12-19, 37-42, 81-123.
200. See, e.g., SAXBY, supra note 123, at 188-92; SYSTEMS INTEGRATION, supra note 102, at
16-39; Davis, supra note 103, at 104-07.
201. See generally WIPO SYMPOSIUM, supra note 46.
202. See, e.g., McCarty, supra note 103, at 32-36 (discussing Cappen and Susskind's Latent Damage Law: The Expert System; symbolic learning algorithms; and Noordewier's neural
network that has been trained to identify DNA splice junctions); Davis, supra note 103, at 102-05
(discussing Harold Cohen's Aaron program); see also Johnson-Laird, supra note 103, at 48-52;
Antonio Mille, Intellectual Property Problems Related to Artificial Intelligence Systems, in
WIPO SYMPOSIUM, supra note 46, at 279, 281.
203. See, e.g., Timothy L. Butler, Can a Computer Be An Author? Copyright Aspects of
Artificial Intelligence, 4 COMM. & ENT L.J. 707 (1982); Samuelson, supra note 19, at 1205-09;
supra note 202.
204. Ineligibility may arise either because the computer-related innovation is viewed as nonpatentable subject matter or because it fails to meet the threshold requirements, especially that of
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/8
nonobviousness, under 35 U.S.C. §§ 103, 105 (1988). For contrasting views in regard to patenta-
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vincing and workable standards of subject-matter eligibility and of nonobviousness for computer-related inventions, the dangers said to inhere
in the patenting of software remain speculative.20 5 Nevertheless, the
prospects that patentees might one day monopolize self-executing algorithms capable of discerning choices would only compound the public
policy dilemmas already troubling the legal protection of computer programs.2"' To the extent that major adjustments of the patent law are
needed to ensure that direct or indirect protection of algorithms will
not hinder scientific progress,2 0 7 the transaction costs of implementing
an appropriate sui generis regime might be significantly lower in the
20 8
end.
This hypothesis is reinforced by fears that the adoption of a stringent nonobviousness standard to promote competition in the development of computer programs, as some experts recommend, could eventually produce a chronic state of underprotection that would discourage
investment in commercial applications of artificial intelligence systems.20 8 Over time, even the most astounding breakthroughs in artificial intelligence will give way to more routine applications of basic
principles, 210 as occurred in biotechnology once the technical dimensions of the recombinant DNA breakthrough became better understood.21 1 Progress in artificial intelligence, for example, will require

bility, compare Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 14, and Garfinkel, Stallman & Kapor,
supra note 46, with Chisum, supra note 46. For recent developments, see Stern, supra note 46;
Laurie, supra note 46.
205. See, e.g., Laurie, supra note 46, at 136.
206. See, e.g., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES IN SOFTWARE, supra note 82, at 66; Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 14, at 1122-33; see also ANDRE LUCAS. LA PROTECTION DES
CREATIONS INDUSTRIELLES ABSTRAITES 174-81 (1975).
207. See, e.g., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES IN SOFTWARE, supra note 82, at 89-90.

208. See generally Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 14, at 1140-54; Menell, supra
note I10. See also LUCAS, supra note 206, at 269-9 1.
209. See. e.g., LUCAS. supra note 206, at 180-81 (stressing modest percentage of programs
capable of qualifying as true inventions and emphasizing basic need to protect investment in program innovation); Spoor, supra note 103 at 77, 82; Reichman, supra note 5, at 652-55 ("New
Technologies Without the Inventive Step"). See also Ejan Mackaay, Economic Incentives in Markets for Information and Innovation, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 867 (1990).
210.

See, e.g., SYSTEMS INTEGRATION, supra note 102, at 62-72 ("The Next Tier: Building

Systems of Systems"); SAXBY, supra note 123, at 188-91.
211. See, e.g., In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Johnson, Patent Protection
for the Protein Products of Recombinant DNA, 4 HIGH TECH. L.J. 249, 250-52, 260-63 (1990).
Of special concern are the "second generation" analog proteins that may vary from patented
"first-generation" proteins by as little as a single amino acid, which creates difficulties in meeting
the nonobviousness test. of 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988). See Johnson, supra at 260, 263; see also Dan
L. Burk, Biotechnology and Patent Law: Fitting Innovation to the ProcrusteanBed, 17 RUTGERS
COMPUTER AND TECH. L.J. 1, 42-57 (1991); Harold C. Wegner, Purified Protein Patents: 'A
Legal Process Gone Berserk?'; 6 E.I.P.R. 187, 190 (1990). Other problems include the difficulties
of obtaining
process patents,
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computer science to standardize programs for use as building blocks in
larger, more powerful systems.2 1 These components would presumably
shed their novelty along the way, as would the design principles responsible for their productive integration. The progressive failure of commercially valuable components, including outputs, to meet the threshold standards of patent protection, despite subject-matter eligibility,
would then elicit industry pressures to lower the threshold once again.
Stiff standards of patentability would further encourage misguided
efforts to make copyright law the preferred vehicle for protecting artificial intelligence systems, despite the growing disarray that already surrounds copyright protection of ordinary computer programs. As Professor Randall Davis of M.I.T. recently observed, "software is a 'machine'
whose medium of construction happens to be 'text,' " which means that
most of the problems likely to afflict the legal protection of artificial
intelligence are foreshadowed by the unsuccessful application of patent
and copyright laws to computer programs. 213 At best, the traditional
copyright paradigm covers only the static components of computer programs without reaching the dynamic configuration that accounts for
the commercially valuable behavior of any given system.21 4 If widespread recourse to patent law risks giving too much protection to too
few program-related inventions, then copyright law as traditionally interpreted would give too little protection to too many trivial components. Meanwhile, copyright law as judicially interpreted in certain jurisdictions provides far too much protection to far too many program
features for much too long a time.2 15
Unless the United States federal judiciary pulls back from early
protectionist trends, past experience with copyright protection of functional designs in the United Kingdom suggests that the resulting state
of chronic overprotection will ultimately impede progress in computer
science more than patent law at its worst.2 16 In either case, the applied

examination period, disclosure requirements, and the need for university professors to publish their
research results. See, generally, Eisenberg, supra note 187; Burk, supra.
212. See supra note 210. For the problem of standardization generally, see, e.g., Bill Curtis,
Engineering Computer "Look and Feel": User Interface Technology and Human Factors Engineering, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 51, 63-75 (1989); Menell, supra note 82, at 1053-58, 1066-71 (discussing the need for second comers to use prior programming solutions in order to compete effectively on the relevant market segments).
213. See Davis, supra note 103, at 110, 110-19; see also Samuelson, Benson Revisited,
supra note 14, at 1128-29 ("Programs are ... too much of a mechanical process to fit comfortably in the copyright system and too much of a writing to fit comfortably in the patent system");
Garfinkel, Stallman & Kapor, supra note 46, at 51-53.
214. See Davis, supra note 103, at 113-16.
215. See supra notes 33-40, 87-92 and accompanying text.
216. See generally Christine Fellner, The New United Kingdom Industrial Design Law, 19
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scientific know-how actually responsible for most of this progress could
remain excessively vulnerable to appropriation by free-riders in both
domestic and international markets, notwithstanding recent attempts to
redefine international intellectual property law from the top down.117
C.

Limits of the Patent and Copyright Models
Previous studies have tried to show the extent to which the world's
intellectual property system has been overwhelmed by new technologies
that do not fit within the patent and copyright systems."' Problems
arise mainly because the kinds of innovative know-how underlying important new technologies do not lend themselves to trade secret protection despite the great investment in research and development they usually entail. 1 9 Even the most valuable product of incremental innovation
now tends to bear its know-how on its face, which makes technological
innovation in the digital age often easier to duplicate than yesterday's
typical engineering products.2 2 Investors, therefore, lack natural lead
time in which to recoup their investment and turn a profit.2 ' Paradoxically, such products may obtain little or no protection from patent law,
despite their impact on the public welfare, because the nonobviousness
criterion excludes most technological innovations that represent merely
incremental advances over the prior art. 22 Yet, because of their functional character, the new technologies are alien to the spirit of copyright law, which historically rewards works of art and literature without encroaching on the domain of industrial property law. 22 3
The solution requires a law to protect applied scientific know-how,
regardless of the medium of expression in which it is cast. Such a law
should deter free riders without unduly impeding fair followers from
developing incremental innovation of their own. 224 A work in progress,
entitled Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms,225 documents and refines these insights, and little is served by
further anticipating its findings here. For present purposes it suffices to
emphasize that stuffing advanced electronic information tools into
217. See generally Reichman, GATT Connection, supra note 124, at 751-68.
218. See generally Reichman, supra note 5, at 648-67; Reichman, supra note 10, at 123-53;
see also infra note 224 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
220. See, e.g., MAGNIN, supra note 7, at 15-16, 113-16; Elmer Galbi, Proposalfor New
Legislation to Protect Computer Programming, 17 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 280, 291 (1969).
221. See generally Reichman, supra note 5, at 656-62 (citing authorities).
222. See, e.g., Kingston, supra note 6, at 31; Hermann Kronz, Patent Protectionfor Innovations: A Model (Pt. 1), 5 E.I.P.R. 178 (1983).
223. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, I01 U.S. 99 (1879); supra notes 24-27 and accompanying
text.
224. See generally Reichman, supra note 5, at 714-18 ("Redefining the Public Interest").
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copyright law will only exacerbate the unsolved problems currently afflicting the legal protection of computer programs and data bases.
Before these and related problems strain world intellectual property
law to the breaking point, it would be desirable to have law-makers
enact a proper know-how law that provided innovators with artificial
lead time in which to recoup their investments, without, however, succumbing to the philosophical mystique of the mature copyright paradigm. 226
The powerful reproduction rights and long term of protection that
characterize the copyright model implement cultural policies largely irrelevant to the needs of a competitive market. A proper know-how law
would protect the functional behavior achieved by means of certain aggregates of information and not the aggregates of information themselves. Under optimum conditions, such a law would reward both those
who obtain functional improvements by a re-elaboration of pre-existing
components and originators of those components. 27 It could also protect outputs of artificial intelligence machines without necessarily succumbing to pernicious extensions of either patent or copyright doctrines
devised for an era in which the distinction between theoretical and applied science made greater sense.228
One must concede that even a well-crafted law to protect applied
scientific know-how could fail to resolve all the intellectual property
issues that artificial intelligence may pose in the future. As the tool
model that worked fairly well in the context of computer-aided design 229 begins to break down, attempts to link producer inputs with user
outputs in terms of values generated by their interactive processing of
information could raise unique and daunting proprietary claims. The
future importance of parallel processing based on standardized componentry (including standard data bases as well) 210 could eventually
support the hypothesis that electronic information, embodied in the system (and perhaps even in its outputs), should one day become an object
of legal protection in its own right. 23 1 In a world populated by artificial
intelligence machines, adequate incentives for research and develop-

226. See generally Reichman, supra note 10, at 141-53.
227. See generally, Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 50, part Ill.
228. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 194-99.
230. See generally SYSTEMS INTEGRATION, supra note 102, at 74-89.
231. Cf., e.g., Davis, supra note 103, at 116-17. Professor Davis states: "The problems we
face arise most centrally .from the digital medium, i.e., any information in digital form. The
problems arise . . . because information in digital form has a number of remarkable properties. . . . Simply put, for other forms of intellectual property, physical law tends to support
intellectual property law. . . . All of that is missing in the case of information in digital
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ment could depend upon a willingness to protect digital data structures
as such and not just functional configurations representing the knowhow responsible for particular systemic behavior.2"2
If and when the study of artificial intelligence begins to provide a
stream of semi-autonomous decision making tools, in short, aggregates
of electronic information may have to be viewed as a kind of tool in
their own right. The possibility that data structures might one day constitute a marginal case beyond even the marginal case of applied scientific know-how should not, however, deflect attention away from the
present need for a know-how law that could integrate a proliferating
array of legal hybrids into a unified field of protection.2 33 Until the
intellectual property community is persuaded to set this goal and begins to elaborate the requisite technical machinery, one prefers not to
contemplate additional protective schemes that could burden free research or encourage oligopolistic industries to foster new barriers to
entry.
Meanwhile, electronic information tools pose a challenge to world
intellectual property law that will not go away. Wherever one looks,
one is struck by the extent to which domestic laws applicable to patents, copyrights, trade secrets, unfair competition, trade marks, and industrial design are increasingly destabilized by the need to deal with
aspects of new technologies for which they are inherently unsuited. The
predominant tendency is to disaggregate each new technology into its
component parts and then to assimilate these parts to existing legal
paradigms, with the excuse that international politics justifies the ensuing distortions to domestic market forces.2 3 4 The more that these overlapping legal subcultures compete with each other, the harder it becomes to disentangle applied scientific know-how from their separate
protective strands. Rather than facing up to the new problems likely to
arise from a single sui generis regime to protect such know-how, the
intellectual property community is currently experiencing the simultaneous evolution of six or more poorly designed sui generis laws, as each
traditional regime mutates in unexpected ways under the pressure of
events.
While some may continue to believe that cumulating inappropriate
modes of protection benefits innovators, the evidence suggests that the
legal process itself has slowed the pace of innovation, at least with respect to ordinary computer programs, and that it has especially harmed
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the small and medium-sized firms that are (or were) its major exponents. Unless the urge to throw assorted legal regimes at a moving target is resisted in the interest of a more rational and constructive debate,
the advent of still more difficult challenges in the form of computergenerated productions, computer-aided design, and artificial intelligence machines could bring the classical intellectual property system to
its knees, with grave consequences for a domestic economy that increasingly depends on its comparative advantages in technological
innovation.
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